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Between 1978 and 1984, a massive shift from collective to household agricultural production took place 
in China. These incremental reforms, which Deng Xiaoping called “crossing the river while feeling the 
rocks,” eventually gave 95 percent—160 million rural Chinese families—the right to oversee household 
plots, leading to stunning gains in productivity.1
Despite the success of the HRS, the enhancement of property rights is an ongoing reform process. 
Landholders depended on tenure agreements that could be changed at any time. Rural areas did not have 
the same right to profit from appreciating land values as urban landholders. As cities have expanded 
rapidly, municipalities have requisitioned rural land and issued it to new users at urban prices much 
higher than that paid to the rural villages. The policy debate about the appropriate pace for strengthening 
rural land use rights continues.  
 This reform, the Household Responsibility System 
(HRS), provided strong incentives for farmers to increase labor and improve land, since they could profit 
from any marketable surplus they produced. Meanwhile, the state set quotas and purchased crops, 
providing reliable markets for increased production. It also strongly supported farmers by managing 
irrigation and the agricultural extension system. The state’s earlier investments in rural nonfarm 
infrastructure paid off under the reforms, as workers released from agriculture by the more efficient use of 
labor found employment in local rural industries. In the years following the property reforms, the quality 
of life in rural China improved dramatically: per capita rural income more than doubled from 1978 to 
1984. 
Having examined the substance, process, and effects of the reforms, this paper asks what lessons 
from the reforms are relevant for other developing countries. In spite of differences among countries, 
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In 1977, faced with near famine conditions, poor villages in Anhui Province experimented with a return to 
household farming, which led to impressive productivity gains. Facing up to the weak performance of 
collective agriculture and near famine conditions in many areas of the country, the Communist Party in 
1978 reluctantly embraced these remarkably heterodox experiments. The new system was known as the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) because parcels of collective land allocated to farm households 
to manage came with obligations to produce specific quotas of key economic crops and to sell them to the 
state at fixed prices. Once permitted, the system spread throughout China like wildfire, so that four years 
later the communes’ land, over 90 percent of the country’s farmland, had been parceled out to more than 
160 million farm households. This remarkably rapid implementation was only possible because the 
reform was largely self-implemented by local communities.  
The state procurement system provided the new family farmers with a guaranteed market for a 
quota of a key economic crop, albeit at below-market prices. After 1977, the state raised its procurement 
prices; in 1979, alone state procurement prices for major crops, on average, increased 22.1 percent. The 
new family farmers lacked full security of tenure; they had only annual land use contracts and had to deal 
with periodic reallocations of land among households to maintain equality in landholding. Nevertheless, 
the opportunity to work the land themselves for the direct benefit of their families elicited a remarkable 
response from farmers.  
By 1983/84, annual household investments in agriculture averaged more than twice the annual 
combined state and collective investments during the same period. Production grew rapidly: crop output 
grew 42.2 percent during 1978–84. The annual growth rates for the three most important crops, grain, 
cotton, and oil-bearing crops, averaged 4.8, 17.7, and 13.8 percent, respectively, between 1978 and 1984. 
(During the preceding 26 years the average growth rates for these crops had been only 2.4, 1.0, and 0.8 
percent per year, respectively.) The changes in farm scale and organization of production, which had 
posed difficulties in many land reforms elsewhere, seem to have been eased by the fact that local 
institutions such as the township and collective continued to support agricultural development. 
While increases in state procurement prices clearly had some impact on production, most studies 
suggest it was surprisingly small: the change in the form of production organization, the HRS reform, 
accounted for between 50 and 85 percent of production increases. Farm families responded to their 
opportunity to sell a part of their production at market prices by investing large amounts of labor and 
inputs to exceed their quota, while at the same time diversifying their production into nonquota crops. 
Labor supervision by the household was far cheaper and more efficient than that of the commune and 
brigade, and with the outflow of surplus labor, labor efficiency and production efficiency generally 
increased. Area cropped area declined slightly but production still grew.  
The labor that had been underemployed under the commune system was now released; it needed 
to find work, and given the tight controls on labor migration, it had to be local work. Townships and 
collectives took advantage of this and of new revenue under the HRS to develop township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), building on the basis of the commune industries and large public investments in 
infrastructure during the commune period. The TVEs were public but produced for the market, and they 
grew rapidly. In 1978, the TVE gross output value was just 7.2 percent of China’s total output value. In 
the 1980s, 60 to 70 percent of rural output value was produced by TVEs. The number of firms increased 
from 1.5 million in 1978 to nearly 25 million in 1994, while the number of employees increased by a 
factor of 4.5 and total output value by a factor of 80. This sector grew far more rapidly than the state 
industrial sector. 
In the years following these reforms, the quality of life in rural China improved substantially, 
reducing (though not nearly eliminating) a long-standing gap between rural and urban households. 
Between 1978 and 1983, per capita rural income more than doubled. The rural poverty rate fell from 76 
percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 1985, and over the 20 years after 1981, it fell to 8 percent. Poverty 
increasingly became a regional issue, related to resource endowments. Food access and affordability  
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improved. Energy intake increased by 12 percent in the first four years of the HRS reforms (1978–81). 
Energy intake as a proportion of the minimum rural requirement was 122 percent in 1978, and in 1979–81 
it ranged between 140 and 143 percent. After 1978, consumption of foods other than grain rose rapidly, 
with an increase of 40 percent in the areas devoted to nonquota crops.  
By the end of the 1980s, growth rates in agriculture slowed. A policy debate ensued over whether 
it was necessary to strengthen farmers’ rights over their farmland, which remained collectively owned and 
farmed on contract. The government announced gradual increases in the duration of production contracts, 
with longer contracts for areas requiring more investment such as those that reclaimed degraded hillside 
land, and it discouraged frequent redistributions of land. Initially optional, these changes have now been 
built into new land legislation. There is an emerging consensus that China should move toward fuller and 
more marketable property rights in rural land but also a consciousness that land is performing important 
social security and safety net functions. A debate continues on how to balance the benefits to efficiency of 
liberalization of farmers’ rights toward marketability and the losses to social security consequent to 
reforms that would make rights more marketable. Reforms have come painfully slowly.  
Rural households are still seriously disadvantaged. While urban landholders, with more 
marketable use rights, enjoy the benefit of appreciation of the land they hold, rural people do not. This is 
most painfully evident at the interface between rural and urban land, where municipalities compulsorily 
acquire rural land, compensate rural landholders modestly, and then sell that land to urban users at much 
higher prices, generating huge public revenues that have fueled both impressive urban infrastructure 
development and corruption in the use of these off-budget funds. 
The HRS reform and the other reforms it sparked have contributed greatly to the economic 
development of China and the welfare of its citizens. Many developing-country policymakers, in thinking 
through their own reform programs, should consider the lessons learned in China.  
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2. LAND REFORM IN CHINA 
During the period 1978–84, when Chinese communities implemented a decollectivization reform of 
stunning scope, the management of about 95 percent of farmland in China was returned to more than 160 
million farm households. The gains produced were equally impressive. Production and productivity per 
hectare increased markedly, with readily discernible impacts on the incomes, food security, and 
nutritional levels of Chinese families. The efficiency gains in agriculture released a large amount of 
surplus labor that had existed under collective cultivation, and this in turn fueled the development of 
China’s equally remarkable rural industrialization, accomplished through development of TVEs. In more 
recent years, the government has turned its attention to gradually strengthening the property rights of the 
households that were reform beneficiaries.  
What was the basis in economic theory for this land reform and its success? The economic 
literature recognizes two fundamental institutional reforms in the land sector: land reform and land tenure 
reform. There is a consensus among economists that where labor is relatively cheap, household farming 
enjoys advantages in labor supervision that make it more efficient in using land than larger-scale 
operations, even though the latter may be more highly mechanized. Few larger-scale economies exist, and 
those that do are not in production itself but in primary processing and marketing. Most often, 
historically, large agricultural holdings have not been the product of market forces and have less to do 
with efficiency than with power, domination, and ideology. Land reform is the scaling-down of those 
large units, usually through a process of subdivision, to smaller, more efficient farm sizes. When these are 
given to families in secure tenure, there is a significant distribution of wealth and economic opportunity in 
the society. The principle is the same regardless of whether one is reforming Latin American latifundia or 
collective farms in socialist contexts (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995).  
The economic literature also asserts that the quality of land rights affects the landholder’s 
investment incentives. Tenure security, the confident expectation of being able to continue in possession 
of one’s land long enough to recoup investments in land, and even to leave the land to one’s heirs, 
strengthens substantially the farmer’s incentive to invest. This is especially important to investments in 
activities such as soil building, tree planting, or terracing, which enhance the long-term productivity of the 
land. The rights to transfer and mortgage land are again asserted to affect both investment incentives 
(since the investment is reflected in the market value of the land) and credit access (because the land can 
be used to secure loans). Land tenure reform involves increasing the robustness of the property rights of 
the producer, increasing incentives to invest and thus the productivity of the land. This is a core 
understanding, reflected in policy prescriptions of the international development community and in 
particular the World Bank (Feder and Feeney 1992; Deininger 2003).  
The literature on rural reform in China typically breaks the rural reform into the “incentive 
reforms” that dominated the period 1978–84 and the gradual market liberalization that began in 1985 and 
extended through the 1990s (see, for example, Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle 2007). This paper instead 
focuses on the two land reforms. The first reform, the return to household farming from collective 
agriculture, was together with price reforms part of the “incentive reforms” that took place during the 
period 1978–84. The second, a gradual enhancement of property rights, paralleled the market liberation 
beginning around 1989 and ongoing today. The first is considered a spectacular success, while the second 
remains incomplete and its effects are still being assessed.  
The constant throughout these two reforms is what Chinese documents refer to as the “two-tier 
system:” public (collective or state) ownership of land and private-use rights to land rather than full 
private ownership for users. This conceptualization, with its retention of public ownership of land, has 
made it possible for a communist state to embrace a reform process that has moved China ever closer to 
de facto private property in land.  
This paper focuses primarily on the first reform, known as the Household Responsibility System 
(HRS) Reform It explores its impacts on production, investment, food availability, and welfare, but it also 
covers the ongoing process of strengthening producer property rights, with some limited evidence  
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regarding the actual and potential impacts of this second reform. It finally turns to the “unfinished 
business” of land reform in China and the extent to which lessons learned there may be applicable 
elsewhere. Table 1 summarizes the changes that took place during the reform period.  
Table 1. Summary statistics of changes in rural China, 1978 to 1984  
  1978  1984  % 
Rural households impacted by the land reform (million)  160     
Changes in grain yield (kg/mu)
a  169  239*  41.42 
Changes in food production (100,000 tons)
b        
Grain  3,047.5  4,070  33.55 
Cotton  21.7  62.5  188.02 
Oil-bearing  52.2  118.5  127.01 
Tea  2.7  4.1  51.85 
Sugar  211.2  396.6  87.48 
Meat (pork, beef, lamb)  85.6  152.5  78.15 
Changes in per capita food consumption (kg)
c       
Grain  195.46  249.65  27.72 
Edible oils  1.6  4.66  191.25 
Pork  7.67  12.93  68.58 
Beef and lamb  0.75  1.23  64 
Portray  0.44  1.35  206.82 
Egg  1.97  3.88  96.95 
Aquatic products  3.5  4.32  23.43 
Changes in rural per capita income (% and yuan)
d  220  522  137.27 
Changes in calories consumed (% and kcal/day)
e  2,226.9  2,450**  45.5 
Changes in rural poverty rate (%)
f  33%  11%  -22 
Changes in rural nonagricultural labor force (10,000)
G  3149.5  5169.6  47.04 
*This figure is for 1988. 
** This figure is for 1980. 
Sources:  
a. Chen, Chen, and Yang, 1992, 536. 
b. State Statistical Bureau, various years.  
c. Zweig 1997, 14.  
d. State Statistical Bureau, various years. Cited in Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004, 397. 
e. Wakashiro 1989, 18. 
f. Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004, 396. 
g. Chen, Chen, and Yang, 1992, 603. 
Before the Reform: Collective Agriculture 
After the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, it launched a brief program providing land 
parcels to households for them to manage and cultivate. That program was followed by the creation of 
production cooperatives, beginning in 1956, followed in 1958 by a dramatic scale-up to communes, 
averaging 5,000 households and consisting of several production brigades, further divided into production 
teams of 20–30 households. The commune might include as much as 10,000 acres. Work on private plots 
was prohibited (Fan and Pardey 1995, 8). Rural land was “owned” jointly by the commune, the 
production brigade, and the production team, with the production team serving as the basic accounting  
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unit (Zhang, Li, and Shao 2006, 609). The smallest unit of organization of productive activities was the 
production team, but most tasks were managed at a higher level, such as the brigade. During this period, 
the production team had no real power, and it was not uncommon for the team’s land to be appropriated 
for the collective enterprises of the commune or brigade (Ho 2003). 
The collectivization of agriculture was expected to benefit from the economies of scale predicted 
by Marx and also to provide a base for the development of rural industries. It was also intended, suggests 
Lin (2003, 14), “to serve industrialization by affecting a mandatory drain on rural surplus. Taxation was 
carried out through the control of basic rural production factors, the monopoly in the circulation of 
agricultural products and especially price scissors between industrial and agricultural products.” He notes 
that Chinese economists have assessed the total value drained from agriculture through scissor pricing 
from the 1950s to the 1980s at 600–800 billion yuan. 
The impacts on production of collectivization were disappointing. Grain production in China rose 
during the 1949–52 land-to-the-tiller period by 13.14 percent and continued to increase, if less strongly, 
during the agricultural cooperatives period (1952–58). But with the Great Leap Forward to communes in 
1959, grain production declined. The country suffered serious famine in 1960–63. Grain production 
recovered by 1968 and continued to increase thereafter, though the amount of land cultivated did not 
return to 1958 levels. During the 20 years from 1957 to 1978, the annual income per peasant increased 
from Y87.6 to Y133.6, but the amount of commercial grain contributed by each rural resident declined 
from 85.05 kilograms to 62.6. Shortages of food supplies spread throughout the country, and coupon food 
rationing was introduced in urban areas. Rural areas also suffered from food shortages from the early 
1960s to 1987. Zhang, Li, and Shao (2006, 614-615) estimate that during the 1970s, one-third of the rural 
population did not have a stable food supply. Du Runsheng, the Party’s Director of Rural Policy from 
1978 recently summed up the situation: “Per capita grain production never averaged much more than 300 
kilograms. Of the 800 million peasants, 250 million were impoverished. The nation as a whole could not 
achieve self-sufficiency in grain and required massive imports” (Du 2006, 2).  
Collective agriculture ultimately proved incapable of fostering agricultural productivity 
comparable to that of the “Asian tigers” such as Taiwan and South Korea. Distorted incentives were at the 
base of the failure. In spite of the system’s highly egalitarian aspirations, a work point (gongfen) system 
was introduced in an attempt to create incentives for harder work, but supervision of labor in the brigade 
proved extremely difficult. Ultimately each worker received the same number of work points each day 
regardless of the quality or quantity of his labor. With little incentive for individuals to invest their labor, 
productivity of labor and productivity per land unit declined. Shared tasks without accountability resulted 
in extensive disguised underemployment (Lin 1988, S200; Lin 1990; Lin 2003, 141). Government tried to 
deal with these problems by progressively shifting farm management tasks to lower levels within the 
commune hierarchy. By 1962, the production team had become the basic unit of operation and 
accounting. Decisions regarding farm operations, including the adoption of new technologies, were 
primarily made by team leaders (Fan and Pardey 1995, 8).  
The Reform Begins: Desperation, Experimentation, Replication  
China began to abandon collective production, returning to household farming in the late 1970s. The 
reform process began with local experimentation in Fengyang County in poverty-ridden Anhui Province, 





The shape taken by the reform was influenced by farmers’ memories of household farming, even after 
two decades of collective agriculture, and their ongoing experience with their small household food plots. 
Even in the 1960s and 1970s, when the agricultural sector was collectivized, farmers still managed these 
                                                       
2 See Yang and Su (1998) for an account of the politics of famine and reform in China.   
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small plots. They accounted for about 6.2 percent of cultivated land (Li, Rozelle, and Huang 2000, 5). 
The high productivity of these small “food plots” (usually smaller than 0.02 hectares but several times 
more productive than the collective’s land), suggested the potential of a return to small household farms 
(Zhang, Li, and Shao 2006, 611, 616). In addition, the idea of a return to family farms was not new. Early 
experimentation with bao gan dao hu (contracting everything to the household) went back to the late 
1950s. It spread in Henan Province in 1959 and in southwest and northwest areas of China in 1964. These 
experiments were publicized widely, but were phased out forcefully by government shortly after their 
introduction (Zhang 1998).
3
The reform began in 1978 when a few production brigades in Anhui Province secretly distributed 
their land to their member households to farm. The year’s productivity increases were impressive. Some 
brigades in Anhui that returned to household farming had production increases two-to-five times larger 
than those in unconverted brigades (Lin 1988, S221, note 8). Local officials embraced the reform, which 
was then carried out under the protection of Wan Li, the provincial governor of Anhui (Ho 2005, 11).  
 
By 1976, Chairman Mao had died and the Cultural Revolution had come to an end. The country was in 
chaos, and there were grain failures and famine in parts of China. The time was right for the Party to 
reconsider its options. As late as 1977, a return to household farming was specifically forbidden by the 
Central Committee of the Party. Because the performance of collective agriculture had been better in the 
more fertile coastal areas, opposition to reform was considerable in those provinces. Gradually, however, 
the Party came to accept the idea of contracting land to households. Wan Li was promoted from Anhui to 
the Politburo, and the Fengyang experiments received support from influential leaders such as Chen Yun 
and Hu Yaobang. In 1978, the Plenum of the 11
th Central Committee of the Communist Party allowed the 
option of breaking up the communal lands into household holdings (Ho 2005, 11). 
At first the Party considered the new system appropriate only for the poor areas of western and 
central China affected by famine, not the more developed coastal regions. Many considered it a temporary 
expedient. The formula under which the change was permitted did not refer to “land reform,” but rather 
conferred “five rights” to production teams: the right to select production crops appropriate to local 
conditions, the right to make rational decisions for management and administration, the right to adopt 
other measures to increase output, the right to distribute products and cash according to their wishes, and 
the right to reject improper instructions from administrative agents (Zhang, Li, and Shao 2006, 611).  
Sustaining the return to household farming against ideological opposition required skillful 
manipulation of ideological themes in the service of pragmatism. Du Runsheng was a key figure in this 
process.
4
It is also a general rule that large-scale production – whether capitalist or socialist 
– is superior to the small-farmer economy… But the scale of production cannot be 
determined just by looking at land size. Lenin once said: “A reduction in farm acreage 
during the intensification of agriculture very often implies an increase in the scale of 
production and not a decrease.” He also said, “The principal line in the development of 
capitalist agriculture is changing the economy that is still small-scale in terms of land 
 Du (2006, 3) describes three key points in the reformers’ strategy for winning acceptance of the 
reform within the Party: (1) build the system initially within the communes, rather than abolishing the 
communes; (2) allow a number of forms, among which the populace could choose; and (3) allow the 
reform to spread gradually. In a 1982 speech, Du (1995, 50) provided an ideological basis from the works 
of Lenin for moving to a smaller scale of production:  
                                                       
3 Zhang et al. (2006: 611, 616) provides a detailed account of the return to family farming in late 1978 in the village of 
Xiaogang in Fengyang Country of Anhui Province. 
4After the Third Plenum of the 11
th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (1978), Du Runsheng held the post 
of Director, Rural Policy of the CCP Central Committee, and Director of the Rural Department, Research Center for Rural 
Development. He provided leadership in the drafting of the rural-related policy documents for the Central Committee and the 
State Council, including the decisive “No. 1 Documents” on rural development policy, issued each year for five years (1982–86) 
by the CCP Central Committee. These documents, which reflect a remarkable blend of ideology and practicality, allowed the 
HRS reform to keep moving forward before it had fully proven itself and while it was still politically vulnerable.   
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area into one that is large in terms of scale of production, development of animal 
husbandry, amount of fertilizer use and degree of mechanization”. Clearly the scale of 
production is not equivalent to the amount of land under cultivation. What matters is the 
degree of the organic composition of capital
5
The new system spread by voluntary decision of the local collectives.
 and the level of farmland intensity. 
6 It spread rapidly and not 
only in the poorer areas (Ho 2005). In January 1980 only 1.02 percent of all production teams in China 
had changed over to household farming, but by December 1980 the figure was 14.4  percent, then 28.2 
percent by July 1981, and 45.1 percent by October 1981. By 1981, when government finally recognized 
that the HRS reform was broadly applicable, 45 percent of the production teams in China had already 
been dismantled (Lin 1988, S201; Lin 1992, 36; Lin 2003, 144).
7
There are few land reforms that can compare with this for rapid implementation of land 
redistribution. In a few years, collective land was contracted out to more than 160 million households (Ho 
2005, 11). Self-implementation by local communities delivered a reform that was incremental and gradual 
but remarkably rapid.  
 By the end of 1983, about 97.7 percent 
of production teams and 94.2 percent of the farm households in China were farming under the new system 
(Lin 1988, S222, note 10). The shift was often rapid. Household farming began to appear in Hunan at the 
end of 1981 and by the end of 1982, 90 percent of the production teams had adopted the system (Lin 
1991, 364).  
The Household Responsibility System Reform 
The new system of contracting land to the household was known as the Household Responsibility System 
(HRS). Land continued to be “owned” by the old production brigade under the collective system, but 
these units began the transition from production organizations to communities.
8 A community’s rural land 
under HRS typically existed in one of four categories: residential land, construction land, responsibility 
farmland, and household food plots.
9
                                                       
5 The term used by Marx for the ratio of “fixed capital,” or nonlabor costs of production to total capital, including both fixed 
capital and labor costs.  
 The reform was focused on responsibility farmland, the collective 
farmland from the commune period. The reform went through a number of stages in some communities, 
usually within a few years. Lin (2003, 142–143) describes the stages: (1) an initial phase known as the 
group work-contract phase, in which the production team was assigned a quota and the whole group was 
then awarded or punished according to their performance; (2) a second phase called the household output-
quota contract phase, in which a specific output quota and plot were assigned to the household, and output 
exceeding the quota would be given to the household or shared between the household and the production 
team; and (3) the household responsibility system, identical to the second phase except that there was no 
unified allocation of income by the production team. Not all communities went through all three stages, 
and many who did moved through them in successive years.  
6 Lin (1987) analyzes the reform as farmers’ institutional choice, using the model of induced institutional innovation 
developed by Hayami and Ruttan (1985). 
7 For a discussion of the politics and ideological debates around these changes, see Zweig (1997, 62–67). 
8 Ho (2001) analyses what he describes as the “deliberate institutional ambiguity” involved in the statement that the rural 
collective owns the land. The “administrative village” (the successor to the brigade) most often did the contracting of land to 
farm households, and it was often not clear whether it was this administrative village or the “natural village” (the successor to the 
production team) that owned the land. Inconsistent use of terms such as “farmers’ collective,” “collective economic 
organization,” and “villagers’ committees” in instructions of land confounded cadres responsible for implementing them.  
9 Rural homes were privately owned by households, though the land on which they stood was still owned by the collective. 
Housing sites were obtained without charge by residents and could not be transacted, though they could be inherited with a house 
if the heir was a resident of the collective. The house plot and the household food plot have been the most secure tenure niches in 
rural China, with no term limit. Construction land was land allocated to public facilities and enterprises based on a contract for 
building. In this case there was considerable variability of terms among the contracts within and among communities, depending 
on the enterprise and the use.   
8 
Under the HRS, the collective farmland was distributed to households to cultivate as “responsibility 
land,”
10
Tenure to users of farmland was provided through contracts from the brigade’s executive 
committee. These were one-to-three-year contracts with households and included an obligation on the part 
of farmers to produce specific amounts of staple crops (rice, wheat, and some others) for sale to the state 
at fixed prices (hence the emphasis on “responsibility” in the term Household Responsibility System). 
Crops produced over these quotas could be sold on the open market, as could crops not covered by 
quotas. The use contracts could involve relatively modest use charges, could be inherited by resident 
heirs, and could be subleased but not otherwise transferred. One finds variations among communities, 
because the contracts were produced locally (there was no national model contract), but this is the broad 
pattern (Wang 2005).  
 usually with some services (tractor plowing, irrigation maintenance) being provided by the 
production teams. It was distributed strictly according to household size, without reference to the size of 
the labor force. The distribution was highly egalitarian, and as a result the household’s holding on the 
average was fragmented into an average of nine tracts, even though the size of a holding was only about 
1.2 acre (Lin 1989, 16). Regulations prohibited sales of use rights, rentals, and use of land as collateral of 
both privately and collectively managed land (Li, Rozelle, and Huang 2000, 6).  
The highly egalitarian ethos of the villages led to frequent redistribution of the responsibility land 
(referred to as “adjustments”) to ensure equality of holdings as families changed over time. 
Redistributions were often at the initiative of the collective but also took place to accommodate 
government projects that needed land. Other factors were in play as well: a desire on the part of 
government to prevent development of too strong a sense of land proprietorship on the part of farmers, 
and on the part of collective cadres, a desire to take advantage of the considerable rent-seeking 
opportunities such redistributions offered (Wang 2005; Rozelle et al. 2005). Land redistribution 
frequencies varied considerably. Li, Rozelle, and Huang (2000, 6) found that more than 90 percent of the 
villages in Hubei had readjusted in the past 15 years, but in Sichuan, the percentage with readjustments 
was only 22 percent.  
While security of tenure left something to be desired under the early HRS, the HRS still had 
manifest advantages. Ling (1991, 148) summarizes them: the flexibility to use family resources to deal 
with temporary labor shortages, the ability of the family to adjust expenditures, the low management costs 
of self-management, the production unit being conterminous with the consumption unit, and the fact that 
the income and living standards of households now depended on themselves and how they managed their 
farm. The farmers in Ling’s study pursued their comparative advantage, reducing areas under grain and 
shifting to oil-bearing seeds, tobacco, and vegetables and moving into animal husbandry (Ling 1991, 
106).  
The new household farmers had one important advantage over many land reform beneficiaries, 
which often found their input supply and marketing chains badly disrupted or still controlled by former 
landlords. The beneficiaries of the HRS reform had a guaranteed market for a quota amount of their major 
crops at state-set prices and the opportunity to sell their over-quota production and nonquota products to 
the state at market prices.  
A Parallel Reform: The State Procurement System  
The sad state of Chinese agriculture in 1977 led government to introduce a significant reform of the 
system of state procurement of agricultural products and procurement prices at the same time that the 
                                                       
10 Li, Rozelle, and Huang (2000) indicate that at the outset of the reform, local leaders allocated the collective land to 
peasants in three tenure types: ration land (kouliang tian), to meet household subsistence requirements, responsibility land (zeren 
tian), given on the condition that farmers deliver a low-price grain or cotton quota to the state, and contract land (chengbao tian), 
auctioned off by village leaders for a fee. Not all villages had all three categories of land, and land tenure types differ sharply 
among the villages: while all villages had responsibility land, a minority had contract land and less than 20 percent had ration 
land.   
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HRS reform was getting underway. This was in fact the primary government response to the food crisis. 
The HRS was a more spontaneous development later embraced by government. 
In 1977, government was the only legal purchaser of many key commodities, including rice, 
wheat, maize, oilseeds, and cotton. Provinces were assigned quotas by central government and these were 
broken down geographically, so that production teams, at the base of the pyramid within the communes, 
were assigned quotas. Quota production had to be marketed to the state at prices set by the state. With the 
division of communes into household farms, these quotas became the responsibility of households, 
assigned by the same contract that allocated them their farmland. The state was in these years effectively 
a monopoly purchaser of quota production, of grain and key agricultural products produced in excess of 
quotas, and often even of nonquota crop production. 
After 1977, the state procurement prices were raised to increase farmers’ incentives. In 1979 
alone, state procurement prices for major crops, on average, were increased 22.1 percent. The government 
also began to increase grain imports and loosened restrictions on private interregional trade in agricultural 
products (Lin 1992, 34, 39). Government purchasing prices rose greatly in the years after 1979, those for 
grain by 100 percent and those for many other crops by 40–50 percent, with free market prices still higher 
(Ling 1991, 106). Huang (1998, 57) provides procurement prices for 1952–90 (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. State and market prices of grain, 1952–90 
 
Source: Huang 1998, 57. 
At the same time, the state introduced important reforms in the state procurement system. From 
1977 onward, farmers were allowed to trade grain on free markets once they fulfilled their delivery quotas 
to the state procurement system. Bans that prohibited peasants from growing cash crops were terminated. 
Farmers regained the right to grow vegetables or other nonquota cash crops and to sell their products in 
the open markets. Trade in urban areas was still restricted in the initial stage, however, and most markets 
were still substantially controlled by the government (Jia and Fock 2007, 2).  
Since 1988, a series of reforms have sought to further change the incentive structures of grain 
production, consumption, and exchange. To enhance farmers’ incentives to undertake grain production 
and exchange, either the state purchase price has been raised or the quantity purchased at the lower state 
price has been reduced, depending on the measures adopted in the marketing reforms (Kung 1992, 165–
166). To secure low consumption prices in favor of urban areas and industry, the domestic grain market 
was rationed. The state raised grain prices a number of times after 1979. Grain rationing was abolished in 
the early 1990s, but the government remained intent on keeping grain prices low and supply stable for 
urban areas.   
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Control on retail prices in urban areas was retained, keeping urban food cheap (Ling 1991, 112). 
Consequently, as pricing of agricultural production was liberalized, the fiscal burden on government rose 
substantially. Subsidies by the state for food consumption by the urban population increased substantially 
to Y27.5 billion per year in 1985, or a fourth of the wage bill of all state employees (Lin 1989). Du (2006, 
9–10) attributes the problems in the years after 1986 to government increasing the grain purchase price 
without correspondingly raising the price at which it would be sold to city people: “Thus the more grain 
production increased, the greater the financial subsidy, and massive increases of grain bought at higher 
prices created a burden too heavy for the state finances to bear…”  
Grain prices fell sharply during the good harvests, such as occurred in 1991 and 1992, and after a 
glut of grain in 1983/84, government in 1985 cancelled the policy of paying 50 percent more for the grain 
procured beyond the contract amount and instead purchased all grain at an increased average price (Oi 
1999, 619). In the years after 1985, the major variable in determining incomes became marketing, as 
government switched back and forth on key policies in an attempt to balance rural incomes and urban 
food prices. There was an attempt in the early 1990s to raise state procurement prices to market level and 
to dismantle the parastatal marketing system (Jia and Fock 2007, 2). However, food prices rose sharply 
and the state compulsory quota system was again re-imposed for most parts of China in 1995 but at a 
lower procurement level (Huang, Bi, and Rozelle 2004).  
The manner in which this procurement and market reforms were managed is one of the distinctive 
features of the Chinese rural reforms of the 1980s. Whereas most post-Communist countries have gone 
the “big bang” route, with a sudden transition to market prices for agricultural production, China opted for 
a two-track approach, maintaining quotas and set prices for quota production while liberalizing markets 
for nonquota production and allowing markets to control prices for above-quota production of quota 
crops. Chinese and other commentators have suggested that the dual-track approach achieved efficiency 
without creating losers, continuing to enforce the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the 
market as a method of making implicit lump-sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform 
(Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000).  
To Lin (2003, 332–333), it is this “crossing the chasm” between state prices and the market “in 
two steps” that constitutes the genius of China’s agricultural pricing reforms. The approach, he urges, 
provided the state with an assurance of sustained grain production and farmers with an assurance of a 
predictable if modest farm income during a period of great uncertainty. At the same time, it provided 
strong incentives for farmers to (1) exceed quotas and so to be able to market above-quota production 
freely, and (2) to diversify into nonquota crops. Zhang (1998, 165) emphasizes the role that 
experimentation played in the reform and what he calls “institutional learning” through experimentation. 
Regarding the pricing reforms, he notes that under the two-tier price system “… government was able to 
control certain agricultural products, ensuring stability of supply, while some products were allowed to 
enter the markets. This allowed market mechanisms to develop and consumers and producers to adapt 
gradually to a market environment.”  
A Parallel Development: Rural Industrialization  
With the transition to household farming, it became evident that substantial disguised surplus labor had 
existed in collective agriculture. In 1985, the main foodgrain crops required fewer labor days per hectare 
than in 1978—down 22 percent for rice, 48 percent for corn, and 53 percent for wheat (Vermeer 1989, 
85). The labor freed up had to find other local employment. Those thrown off by agriculture could not 
migrate elsewhere to work because of the hukou permit system, a remarkably effective system of strict 
residence control, which kept labor in their existing rural and urban areas (Zhang, Li, and Shao 2006, 
620).  
The solution to the problem of rural labor surplus was rural industrialization, reflected in the 
slogan “Leave the farm but not the village, move to the factory but not the city.” The rapid development 
of the agricultural sector under the HRS reforms created not only a labor surplus but also a surplus of 
funds for local enterprise development (Lin 2003, 311). Township and village governments inherited the  
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collective factories upon the break-up of the communes, and they seized on the opportunity presented by 
cheap, local labor. Rural industrialization was only later embraced by government as policy (Pei 2005). 
The TVEs became the success story of Chinese development in the 1990s. As with the HRS, the TVEs 
were not the brainchild of planners but a spontaneous reaction to market opportunities by local 
governments. They were public but autonomous, and their production and other decisions were market-
driven.  
The rapid launch of rural industries was facilitated by continued collective ownership of land by 
the successors to the communes (Pei 2005). In 1978, the TVE gross output value was just 7.2 percent of 
China’s total output value. In the 1980s, rural industry became the leading force behind rural economic 
development, with 60–70 percent of rural output value produced by township and village enterprises (Lin 
2003, 147, 311). Zweig (1997, 258) shows the dramatic growth, with the number of firms increasing from 
1.5 million in 1978 to 17.5 million in 1987 to nearly 25 million in 1994, while the number of employees 
increased by a factor of 4.5 and total output value by a factor of 80. Table 2 provides more detailed data 
on the development of TVEs between 1978 and 1994. By 1996, China’s rural enterprises employed more 
than 135 million people, about one-third of the rural labor force. These laborers came from the labor 
released by the de-collectivization of agriculture, and yet agricultural production continued to grow (Oi 
1999, 620).  
Table 2. Township and village enterprises, 1978–94 
Year  No. of firms  No. of employees  Total output 
  (1,000s)  (1,000s)  (100 million RME) 
1978  1,524.2  28,265.6  493.07   
1979  1,480.4  29,093.4  548.41   
1980  1,424.6  29,996.7  656.9   
1981  1,337.5  29,695.6  745.3   
1982  1,361.7  31,129.1  853.08   
1983  1,346.4  3,2346.4  1,016.83   
1984  6,065.2  5,2081.1  1,709.89   
1985  12,224.5  69,790.3  2,728.4   
1986  15,153.0  79,371.4  3,540.9   
1987  17,502.4  88,051.8  4,764.3   
1988  18,881.6  95,454.5  6,495.7   
1989  18,686.3  93,667.8  7,428.4   
1990  18,504.0  92,647.5  8,461.6   
1991  19,078.8  96,091.1  11,621.7   
1992  20,792.0  105,811.0  17,975.4   
1993  24,529.0  123,453.0  31,540.7   
1994  24,945.0  120,175.0  42,588.5   
Sources: Zweig 1997, 258. Number of firms and employees, and the total output value come from the State Statistical Bureau 
1995.  
During the 1980s and early 1990s, this expansion of employment in the TVEs was much more 
rapid than that in the state industrial sector. Some of the TVEs were poorly located and, as markets 
became more open, a process of consolidation took place. By the mid-1990s, local governments had 
begun privatizing the TVEs. With the support of the center, they shifted preferential treatment to private 
firms. By the end of 1997, about a third of all collectively owned rural enterprises had been privatized, the 
largest number turned into shareholding companies. Local authorities could afford to shift their support  
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because private firms were finally becoming a viable alternative source of tax revenue (Zhang 1999; Oi 
1999, 624).  
The impact of the HRS, which was extended through the TVEs post-1985, may prove to be more 
important than the direct effects felt during 1978-84. Lin (2003, 312) notes that TVE development, 
sparked by the HRS reform, has driven subsequent reforms: “TVE development was a market driven 
process, and greatly pushed the economic reform toward a market economy, corrected the distorted 
industrial structure, and became part of a dual track system in areas of both resource allocation and price 
formation which placed the traditional system under growing pressure.”  
Rural industrialization and the new prosperity did, however, have a downside for the agricultural 
sector. Land in cultivation declined in the post-reform years, especially in the coastal provinces where 
fertile soils are located. According to Du, Tang, and Zhang (2002), about 30 percent of the diminished 
cultivated land in those areas was occupied by collective-owned industries and 20 percent was used for 
peasants’ dwellings.  
The Property Rights Reform  
The initial impact of the reforms seems to have played out by the end of the 1980s. Fan, Zhang, and 
Zhang (2004, 397) explain that during 1985–89, rural income continued to increase but at the much 
slower pace of 3 percent per year. Rural residents earned less than half of what their urban cohorts earned 
in 1978; rural income was 42 percent of that in urban areas. Due to the success of rural reforms, that 
percentage increased to 59 percent in 1984. However, it declined again to 36 percent in 2000, owing 
mostly to fast growth in urban areas, state manipulation of rural–urban terms of trade, and relatively 
sluggish increases in rural earnings. Rising inequality of rural incomes was apparent after 1995, with 
absolute incomes even falling at the bottom end of the income distribution. Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles 
(2005) attribute most of this decline in welfare to lower agricultural incomes brought about by lower farm 
prices (cited in Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004, 25–27). Agricultural production ceased to grow so rapidly 
and urban incomes grew faster than those in rural areas, leading to an ever-widening gap between urban 
and rural incomes.  
The impacts of the HRS had been so remarkable that the ideological lobby for recollectivization 
had become muted, but old ideas about economies of scale (big is good) persisted. Many Chinese experts, 
including Zhang (1998), attributed lack of greater investment in agriculture to the egalitarian land 
distribution, arguing that it prevented the development of larger farms which could take advantage of 
economies of scale. In the late 1980s, the continuing outflow of labor from agriculture, most pronounced 
in the coastal provinces, engendered a number of experiments with administratively managed “scaling-
up,” that permitted some large operating units to allow for more effective deployment of mechanization. 
The scale experiments involved larger farms managed on contract by private farmers, village 
cooperatives, or other enterprise forms. Most reviews of their performance suggest that they were highly 
subsidized but not more efficient than smallholder agriculture.
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11 Bruce and Harrell (1989) skeptically reviewed scale production experiments in Wuxi, Wu, and Changshu counties of 
Southern Jiangsu Province; in Shunyi County near Beijing; and in Nanhai County of Guangdong Province. The selection of the 
“scale farmers” by the collective often had little to do with managerial ability. Prosterman, Hanstad, and Ping (1998) and 
Prosterman and Bledsoe (2000) also review scale operations critically, noting that the international experience has demonstrated 
that there are few economies of scale in agricultural production (as opposed to primary processing and marketing). They found 
that scale operations in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces were producing at about the same level as smallholders, in spite of 
extensive subsidies, and were equally unconvinced by the scaling-up approach (shareholder systems) practiced in Nanhai.  
 Experimentation with such arrangements 
continues, and spontaneous local solutions make it increasingly difficult to generalize about land tenure 
arrangements in Chinese villages. Zhang (1998) reviews a number of ongoing experiments, including (1) 
the “two-field” system, which allocates a subsistence plot to each household and market production plots 
only to those who wish to farm them and to pay for access to them, and (2) the wasteland contracting 
system, in which those who contract to develop wasteland receive very long-term use rights, which are 
fully transferable and mortgageable (see also Hanstead and Ping 1997). The decentralization of land  
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administration allows a considerable variety of arrangements within the framework of collective 
ownership.  
Alongside the scale debate, another policy debate has gone on over how and when farmers’ land 
rights should be strengthened. The initial HRS contract was annual, and terms could be extended. At the 
same time, however, the debate focused on periodic reallocations of land among farm households, and 
their disincentive effects on investments in land. Such reallocations could override the terms of contracts 
with farmers. Reallocations involved high transaction costs. During the land redistribution in Wugone 
Country after the summer harvest of 1989, 10,000 labor units (persons) per day were set to measuring and 
dividing farmland for one month, at a cost of roughly Y800,000 (Ling and Jiang 1993, 457). The relative 
merits of market or administrative allocation of land are contested ground among researchers (Carter and 
Yao 2005).  
The actual frequency of such reallocations is also contested. A sample survey from the Research 
Center for Rural Development (RCRD) in 1988 showed that 65 percent of 250 sample villages 
nationwide had redistributed land every two years since 1983. The distribution in 91 percent of those 
villages was caused by demographic changes, while only 5 percent reallocated land in order to enable 
farm size to grow, and less than 2 percent did it for plot consolidation (Ling and Jiang 1993, 447). A 2001 
survey conducted under the auspices of RCRD over 1,600 households in 17 provinces found that four-
fifths of the villages had conducted at least one land readjustment since the first allocation after the HRS 
was instituted. In the great majority of villages that had conducted at least one land readjustment, the most 
recent adjustment had occurred within the past five years (DRC and RDI 2002, 22).  
The Development Research Center (DRC) and Rural Development Institute (RDI) study (2002, 
24–30) found a broad awareness that government favored a reduction in the frequency of such 
reallocations (94.1 percent), and those supporting that policy outnumbered opponents 5:1. However, when 
asked about a complete prohibition of readjustments, a slight majority opposed a complete prohibition. 
Interestingly, those whose villages had never had a readjustment more strongly supported prohibition of 
readjustments. They found that more than a third of the contracts and certificates issued to those farmers 
had provisions allowing land readjustments even during the term of long-term contracts. Asked if 
readjustments would continue, 45.8 percent of respondents expected them to continue, whereas only 12.2 
percent felt they would definitely not continue. Reforms to enhance property rights have also been the 
subject of policy experiments, notably in Meitan Country, Guizhou Province.
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These national policy discussions of scale, reallocations, and property rights have led to further 
reforms, but through a very gradual process of legal change. Now, for the first time, Chinese 
commentators on land reform have begun to use the language of property rights, rather than 
responsibilities, having clearly entered the domain of tenure reform. The process of incremental land law 
reform that has taken place is described briefly below, without doing justice to its complexity. The uneven 
implementation of specific tenure reform initiatives makes it difficult both to generalize about the 
situation on the ground and to assess confidently the tenure reform’s impacts.  
  
At the outset, there was no law regarding the HRS, and reforms came through a series of rapidly 
evolving party pronouncements and instructions. This was not unusual in China during that period. China 
strongly exhibited the Marxist contempt for law as a tool of oppression in the hands of the bourgeois 
state. It conveyed less of a sense that law could also be a tool for change than, for instance, Russian 
communism. After flirting briefly with more formal legal modes early on, Mao in 1959 dramatically 
downgraded the role of law and law professionals in Chinese society (Peerenboom 2003, 43–45). The 
approach to normative innovation was ad hoc experimentation, tweaked through a succession of party 
edicts. A basis in law for the new institution would only be provided once the new model had proved 
itself. In China, a new law was not associated with innovation but was seen as evidence that a new 
arrangement had succeeded and was to be enshrined in law. Du (2006, 5) explains  
                                                       
12 The Meitan experiment, elements of which were later widely replicated in Guizhou Province, involved an end to 
reallocations, strengthened use rights, increased marketability (and even mortgageability) of those rights. It is discussed in Bruce 
and Harrell (1989) and at a later stage by Zhou (1994).   
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As recognized by institutional economics, forming a stable system must be a process in which the 
populace chooses for itself. This process included different sides in mutual dialogue that leads to 
coordination and integration, according to the requirements of the interest and political pursuits of each 
side. Given that the Party wanted to give the populace a free choice, we did not need to turn this practice 
into a law of the state for the time being. We had to treat law as an outcome of a social choice and 
eventually provide legal guarantees in the form of law.  
The basic land administration arrangements in the wake of the HRS were first set out in law as 
the Land Administration Law of 1987 a decade after the reform began. A number of important reforms in 
the HRS were being urged by central government by this time. Rural Work Document No. 1 of 1984 
urged local officials to extend the duration of farmland contracts to 15 years and for longer periods for 
special uses such as reforestation and fruit tree plantations. The Politburo’s No. 5 Document of January 
1987 (“Deepening the Rural Reforms”) encouraged farmers who had moved into nonagricultural 
employment to transfer their use rights to others. To this end, the Constitution’s prohibition of all 
transactions in rural land (Article 10) was amended by the National People’s Congress on April 12, 1988 
(Bruce and Harrell 1989).  
The provisions of the new 1987 Land Administration Law reaffirm collective ownership of rural 
land (Article 8) and allocation to households for use under contracts (Article 12). It does not include some 
of the tenure-strengthening measures recommended in Party pronouncements, which were permissive 
rather than mandatory. Local cadres could, and often did, ignore them. During the author’s field work in 
Fujian in the mid-1990s, he realized that while some responsibility contracts were being made for longer 
periods, they still contained clauses providing for reallocations at the discretion of the collective, 
nullifying the greater security of tenure provided to farmers by the longer terms (Bruce and Muo 1988).  
Amendments to the original Land Administration Law, the most recent in 1999, provide for 
issuance of certification and registration of land rights of rural collectives and of user rights over rural 
land for nonagricultural purposes. They require registration of changes in ownership and use of land and 
buildings. They also provide for administrative settlement of land disputes, overall land use planning, and 
the establishment of a land survey system and a land statistics system. Most important, the 1999 
amendments require a minimum term of 30 years for farmland. Longer terms, up to 70 years, are 
available for specialized uses such as forestry or agroforestry on hillside lands and for some construction 
projects.  
The provisions of the Land Administration Law on contracting of farmland remained sketchy. In 
2002, after several years of intensive debate in Party circles, a full legal framework for the HRS was 
provided. The Rural Land Contracting Law became effective on March 1, 2003. It does not replace the 
Land Administration Law, but supplements it. The law confirms a number of administrative orders that 
had strengthened the use rights of rural land users. Now land use contracts must be for 30 years for arable 
land, 30–50 years for grassland, and 30–70 years for forest land. They must be in writing and signed by 
both parties. Readjustments are restricted. Land is not to be readjusted (redistributed by the collective) 
during the contact term, except if this is required by a natural disaster and or unspecified “other special 
circumstances.” Any readjustment during the term of the contract must be approved by two-thirds of the 
members of the village assembly or two-thirds of the village representatives. The village may maintain a 
part of its land in a flexible reserve to adjust landholdings for newly added village population, and it may 
also use reclaimed land and land returned voluntarily by contracting parties for this purpose. The 
contacted land use rights are now clearly inheritable during their terms, an important change.  
The township government is responsible for rural land contracting and contract management 
within its administrative jurisdiction and often provides the needed forms and instructions. The contracts 
are effective when concluded but are required to be registered. The county or higher level of government 
is required to issue to a user a land contracting and operation certificate and to register the contract. The 
Ministry of Agriculture keeps these registries. Fees are not to be collected beyond what is necessary to 
cover the cost of the certificate.  
While the collective cannot normally take back the land during the contract term, the rapid 
growth of urbanization and its impacts are recognized. When land users move to a small township, they  
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can retain their use rights, but if they move to a city and change their household registrations to 
nonagricultural, they must surrender the contacted land. In that case compensation is to be paid for 
investments on the contracted land. The Rural Land Contracting Law confirms the right of the holder to 
transfer (assign), lease, exchange, or otherwise engage in transactions regarding the use right. For 
assignments and exchanges, the permission of the collective must be sought, but for other transactions the 
collective must only be notified. The transaction must be made in writing if it is for more than a year, and 
it must be registered. If it is not registered, the rights are subject to the good faith claims of a third party.  
A collective may contract rural land to a unit or individual outside the collective but only with the 
approval of two-thirds of the village assembly or two-thirds of the village representatives as well as the 
approval of the township government. Provision is made by the Rural Land Contracting Law for 
mediation and arbitration of disputes concerning contracts and for ultimate recourse to the courts, as well 
as for civil and criminal liability for officials and others who violate the procedures required by the Law 
or the rights of land users under the Law. The new law went into effect on March 1, 2003.  
Studies suggest that implementation of the reforms under the 1999 Land Administration Law and 
the 2003 Rural Land Contracting Law has been very uneven (Prosterman, Schwartzwalder, and Jianping 
2000; Prosterman, Ping, and Zhu 2004). They have stressed that while rural land has long remained 
outside the market economy, land use rights in urban land, which is owned by the state rather than the 
collective, has long been readily marketable. Assets in the form of long-term use rights to urban land have 
become an important element in the major wealth differential between urban and rural households. This 
dichotomy introduces major distortions into China’s land economy, a matter discussed in the section 
below on unfinished business. Advocates of stronger rural land rights have continued to assert the need 
for greater security and marketability of rights in farmlands, to allow them to gradually achieve a market-
determined value, thereby eliminating the strong duality that now exists between rights in rural and urban 
land.
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At the close of the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 16, 2007, the 
Congress approved the new Property Law, which took effect on October 1, 2007. It is more important for 
its content on urban land than on rural land. Regarding collective agricultural land, it largely refers to the 
2003 Rural Land Contracting Law. It does, however, provide an important clarification of the nature of 
collective ownership and some other matters, summarized in Zhu et al. (2007, 12–13) and Development 
Research Center and World Bank (2007, 6–7):  
 In 2007, China launched a comprehensive new Property Law, a first and modest step toward 
unifying rural and urban land tenure. 
•  Collective land is owned not by the local collective institutions, but is “collectively owned by 
members of such collectives.” This makes it clear that members have a property interest in 
that ownership, and the language of the Law suggests that compensation should go directly 
into the hands of affected farmers because they are part owners of the property right taken 
away by the state. In the past, compensation went primarily to the collective. 
•  Farmers’ 30-year land rights are for the first time characterized as property rights (as 
opposed to their contractual rights). This should in theory at least make it more difficult to 
take away farmers’ land rights.  
•  National standards now exist for real property registration. The Law requires that the 
establishment, change, transfer, or termination of real property rights be registered to have 
legal effect, unless otherwise provided by law. Regulations are to be separately promulgated 
to govern the registration process and specify the authorities that will be responsible for 
handling registrations. China now has 250 million farm households, with each household 
                                                       
13 Wang (2005) and Prosterman , Ping, and Zhu (2006) both are excellent and relatively up-to-date summaries of the legal 
and regulatory framework for land, but both were prepared during discussions leading up to the enactment of the new Property 
Law, which was still in draft form at the time, and so are not the final word. Wang (2005, 82), commenting on the draft property 
law, worries that “the transitional process” of land tenure reform will be “frozen in time or halted through legislation.”  
16 
having on average five plots, so nationwide land registration and certification will be a 
challenge.
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•  Farmers have modestly improved prospects for extended duration of their land rights, as the 
Law provides in Article 126, which says that “contracting farmers should continue extending 
the contract according to relevant law.” This is not as strong as the wording used for urban 
land use rights, which speaks of automatic renewal (Article149), but it is still the first time 
Chinese law has expressed a presumption in this regard in relation to the 30-year term. 
Article 130 affirms the limitations on readjustments in the Rural Land Contracting Law, but 
breaks no new ground in this regard. 
  
•  Compensation criteria for rural lands now include a requirement that compensation 
arrangements must protect farmers’ livelihoods. While the specific criteria from early law 
and policy pronouncements remain unchanged from the multipliers of average annual crop 
yields under the Land Management Law, Article 42 of the Property Law specifies that 
“…social security benefits [should] be arranged for affected farmers so that their livelihood 
and rights be protected.” This is a positive development and could open the way for payment 
of compensation in excess of the Land Management Law standards, but the requirement is 
vague and could be easily evaded by officials.  
Reformers were in some ways disappointed by the new Property Law. It does not allow rural land 
rights to be used as collateral for loans. Rather than incorporating important new reinforcement of the 
property rights of rural landowners, it tends to consolidate progress already made.
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The future direction of land law reform in China is suggested by a recent policy document 
referred to as the October 2008 CPC Central Committee Decisions. This is a broad policy document 
aimed at a more balanced and integrated rural-urban development. It sets a goal of doubling rural per 
capita incomes by 2020 and includes several major decisions on rural reform and development, with a 
new land policy at its core. Under the new policy, the “existing land contracting relationship shall remain 
stable and unchanged for a long time.” The precise meaning of this statement remains under debate. In a 
recent magazine interview (Caijun, December 12, 2008), Chen Xiwen (Director of the Central 
Government Leading Group of Rural Affairs Office) urged that “The only option is to implement no 
 Provisions allowing 
mortgaging of rural land appeared in earlier drafts, but they were dropped in the final version. Some 
commentators have noted that mortgaging of rural land is not prohibited. Similarly, the Law does not 
directly address the marketability of rural construction land, including housing plots. Again, such 
transactions are not expressly prohibited. These failures to specify reforms leaves the door open for their 
promulgation by party edict at a later date. And it is worth noting that the structure of the law itself 
provides an indication of the reform direction of the future. Instead of having separate sections on urban 
and rural land, it provides rules by type of use right (farmland, construction land, and so forth) and makes 
distinctions within those categories if considered necessary. This seems to suggest an intention to unify 
the systems in the future.  
                                                       
14 Government had already launched a registration pilot with FAO support nearly two years earlier (Project 
TOP/CPR/30088, “Rural Land Registration and Certification Pilot,” begun in 2005). The project is led by the Central 
Government Leading Group of Rural Affairs Office, with participation by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, and the State Council’s Legislative Office. The sites selected are two villages in Feidong County of Anhui Province. 
Significant inconsistencies among the land contracts on record are said to have been a major challenge. A draft strategy document 
recommends moving next to further pilots at different locations and in different economic environments, including urban pilots 
(FAO 2009).  
15 A cautious assessment in a Development Research Center and World Bank report (2007, 1) says that “[The] Property Law 
is unmistakably an advance, it is just as clearly part of an evolutionary process. Indeed, as will be shown, the power of the 
Property Law lies not in that it represents a sudden departure from what has come before, but in the fact that it builds upon and 
consolidates successive policy instruments and legal reforms that have taken root over the last three decades. And by the same 
token, the Property Law is not the end of a journey – as this paper will explore, multiple challenges remain to ensure that land 
policy and its implementation fully supports China’s development objectives.”   
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readjustment in response to change in household size, and cut off the link between household size change 
and change in household landholdings. All household land rights acquired through the Rural Land 
Contracting Law should not be readjusted in the future.” Others in government are less open to a 
perpetual land use right, which they feel would reduce state and collective ownership to a legal 
technicality, much like the residual interest of the Crown in privately owned land in English Law.  
The Decisions go on to state that “…farmers shall be allowed to transfer, lease, exchange, assign 
or join as stock shares land contracting and operation rights legally, voluntarily and in return for adequate 
payment and develop multiple forms of proper scale farming.” This is a strong affirmation of the 
transferability of rural farmland, though mortgaging is still excluded. This seems to suggest that a 
decision has been made to rely on market forces to accomplish any scaling-up of farm sizes that may be 
needed as labor continues to move out of agriculture. 
Finally, and most important, market transactions for commercial purposes in collectively owned 
construction land will now be allowed. This is the most important reform item in this package. It is not 
entirely clear whether it applies to farmers’ residential land, but it is nonetheless a first crack at the state 
monopoly of the market in land for commercial uses. This reform has major implications for land 
requisitioning and compensation for requisitioned land, since this land and the improvements upon it will 
now have a market value. The Decisions say explicitly that the ultimate objective is a unified market in 
construction land, whether it is state or collectively owned. 
The October 2008 Decisions, together with the Property Law passed in March 2007, reflect 
China’s intention to gradually narrow the gap between land tenure in the rural and urban sectors. The 
reforms will eventually require amendments to the Land Administration Law and the Rural Land 
Contracting Law. Implementation is some years away, though in some provinces, such as Guangdong, 
pilots for the sale of collective construction land are already underway with administrative approval. 
China is moving gradually, sector by sector and use by use, into an era of greater transferability of rural 
land use rights. Ultimately, it seems clear to the authors, an integration of urban and rural land markets is 
intended. This would allow China’s rural people to benefit from the appreciating value of their land, as do 
urban landholders.   
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3. LAND REFORM IMPACTS 
The impacts of the first land reform, the HRS reform, have been carefully studied and analyzed. A 
remarkable degree of consensus exists regarding both the positive impacts of the reform and the major 
role it played in initiating broader rural reforms. Those studies focus on the key years 1978–84. In the 
case of the second land reform, the property rights reforms, the situation is quite different. Control of farm 
households over their land has increased gradually, in many small steps, and implementation has been 
halting. It remains partial. Factions in the central government have differing visions of the appropriate 
rate of implementation, and local officials, who have vested interests in their control over land allocation, 
have often stalled changes. The Chinese court system, while it is improving, is not yet a reliable tool for 
enforcing rights against officials. Most of the econometric studies are thus tentative. However, some 
unanticipated results have emerged that deserve consideration.  
HRS Reform Impacts 
A number of indicators have been used to assess the impact of the HRS reforms. These include 
investment in farms, farm productivity, farm income, and, to a lesser extent, food availability and 
nutrition. Reforms often involve a cocktail of reform measures, and a major challenge in assessing their 
effects is disentangling the relative importance of the results achieved by the different measures. 
Fortunately, there are some excellent studies of impacts for the critical years 1977–84, during and 
immediately after implementation of the reforms, before the waters became muddied by many other 
changes.  
Investment Impacts 
Public investment in agriculture was substantial under the commune system. Was this public investment 
continued after the HRS reforms, and to what extent was it supplemented by private investments of the 
new household farmers?  
From 1979, when the HRS had begun to spread rapidly, the government’s investment in 
agriculture declined from Y6.24 billion, reaching Y3.43 billion in 1983, then partially recovered to Y4.68 
billion in 1987. Meanwhile the collectives’ investment decreased from Y8.71 billion in 1979 to Y2.07 
billion in 1985. These declines were however offset by per household investment of Y34.49 in 1981, 
increasing to Y100.13 in 1983, and remaining at an annual level of Y80–100 thereafter. Between 1983 
and 1984, annual household investments averaged Y18.10 billion, more than twice the annual combined 
state and collective investments during the same period and more than the annual combined state and 
collective investments before the reforms (Feder et al. 1992, 2).  
Cumulatively while farmer investments in agriculture were substantial, they were dwarfed by 
farmer investments in residential construction. Housing investment was 85 percent of farmers’ total 
investment in 1982, remaining high throughout the 1980s and still reaching 70 percent in 1992. Feder et 
al (1992, 13) find that the ratio of housing investment to productive investment in the counties they 
studied ranged from 2.71 to 10.88 during the period 1983/84–1987/88. This rush to invest in housing 
reflects the insecurity of tenure on productive land, which was subject to periodic land reallocations, 
compared with the more secure tenure on residential land. Farmer investments in land were for the most 
part not investments in land itself, but in capital stocks such as farm equipment and livestock (Feder et al. 
1992, 13).
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Was investment by the new HRS landholders credit-constrained? Feder et al (1989, 525) indicate 
that institutional and informal credit hardly existed in the 1978–84 period. It is now common, but their 
   
                                                       
16 Investments in capital stocks (livestock and equipment) more than doubled in the five-year period covered by the study 
(1983/84–1987/88), with average annual capital growth of 15 percent over the period covered. Fewer than 10 percent of 
households owned tractors, but a large number of households invested in livestock for food (pigs and poultry) and draft power 
and even boats in one site with extensive canal networks (Feder et al. 1992, 11).   
19 
study found very few instances of the medium- or long-term credit usually required for land 
improvements. Long- and medium-term credit was and is a constraint, they suggest, and they indicate that 
most funds for investment in land are generated by off-farm income of the farm household and relatives.  
Public investment continues to be important. Neglect of facilities was a concern of those who 
analyzed the HRS reforms early on (Bruce and Harrell 1989). Irrigation is the life blood of Chinese 
agriculture, and major irrigation works remained a public responsibility. In any event, the transfer of 
management of these facilities to new institutions seems to have gone more smoothly than might have 
been anticipated. The later literature does not note any significant problems. The ability of government to 
maintain these services to the beneficiaries of the HRS reforms in part accounts for the impressive growth 
and poverty reduction delivered by the reforms.  
Production Impacts 
Research on the effects of the HRS has focused primarily on its impact on productivity, and especially on 
teasing out the relative importance of institutional reforms, pricing reforms, technological change, and 
public investment in achieving the major productivity gains achieved in the years 1978–90.
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Lin (1988, 1989) found in his analysis of provincial-level panel data a 42.2 percent output growth 
in the cropping sector in 1978–84. Between 1978 and 1984, the key years for HRS implementation, the 
annual growth rates for the three most important crops, grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops, averaged 
respectively 4.8, 17.7, and 13.8 percent. This compared favorably with the average growth rates of 2.4, 
1.0, and 0.8 percent per year, respectively, for those crops in the preceding 26 years, 1952–78. Zhang, Li, 
and Shao (2006) estimate grain area output per unit under the HRS to be nearly 25 percent higher than 
that under collective farming. They also find that national grain output rose about 300 million tons in 
1978 and increased to 407 million tons in 1984. As Zweig (1997, 75) points out, this explains why grain 
output could rise even while the acreage under grain decreased. In Table 3, Zweig provides 1978–84 
production rates of various quota and nonquota crops and other agricultural products: 
  
Table 3. Indicators of rural development, 1978–84 (in 100,000 tons) 
  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Grain output  3,047.5  3,321.2  3,205.6  3,250.2  3,534.2  3,872.8  4,070 
Cotton output  21.7  22.1  27.1  29.7  36.0  46.4  62.5
a 
Oil-bearing crops  52.2  64.4  76.9  102.1  118.2  105.5  118.5 
Tea output  2.7  2.8  3.0  3.4  4.0  4.0  4.1 
Sugarcane  211.2  215.1  228.1  296.7  368.8  311.4  396.6 
Meat production   85.6  106.2  120.6  126.1  135.1  140.2  152.5 
(pork, beef, lamb)               
Sources: 1978-81: Zweig 1997, 75; 1982: State Statistical Bureau 1982; 1983: Beijing Review, no. 35 (August 27, 1984); and 
State Statistical Bureau Communique, April 29, 1984; 1984: USDA 1985. 
a. Ministry of Agriculture 1985. 
During 1984–88, grain output declined only slightly, but per unit area of output improved. The 
national grain output increased to 505 million tons in 1996 and reached a high of 512 million tons in 
1998. In Henan, where the HRS was implemented in early 1983, per mu yields of all three key products 
                                                       
17 The analysis here looks at the contracted responsibility land as a whole, but there were important subcategories, in 
particular hillside land. This land, often neglected and denuded in the collective period, has been developed aggressively under 
agroforestry and tree farming, since the advent of the HRS. Initial allocations of forest land to households on the same model as 
farmland unfortunately resulted in deforestation through unsustainable cutting. Later, the emphasis shifted to re-afforestation 
under long-term contracts, with an emphasis on agroforestry. This has been far more successful and is an important 
environmental success of the HRS reform. See Bruce, Rudrappa, and Li (1995) and Zhang and Kant (2005).   
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rose suddenly in that year, by 25.3 percent for grain, 89.3 percent for cotton, and 35.7 percent for oil-
bearing seeds (Ling 1991, 104).  
Early studies ask to what extent these impressive output increases were due to the institutional 
reforms under the HRS and how much they owe to the state price increases during the same period. Lin 
(1992, 46–47) finds that output growth during 1978–84 was 42.2 percent. He concludes that 45.8 percent 
of this output growth came from increases in inputs, the most important being increases in fertilizer 
applications, which alone accounted for about one-third of the output growth. The HRS reform accounted 
for 48.6 percent of output growth, as much as the combined effects of the various input increases. 
Changes in market prices and state procurement prices did not affect productivity, but they did contribute 
nearly16.0 percent of output growth, probably through input use, cropping intension, or crop mix.  
This is roughly in line with the two other serious econometric analyses. MacMillan, Whalley, and Jing 
(1989) found that of the total farm productivity increase in 1978–84, 41 percent of the increase in the 
cropping and animal husbandry sector could be attributed to total factor productivity growth; of that, 78 
percent was attributable to the farm institutional reform (HRS) and 22 percent to price increases. Wen 
(1989) found that farm output increased by 56 percent due to the institution of the household-based 
farming system. Zhang, Li, and Shao (2006) reach similar conclusions.  
However, Fan (1991) raises an interesting question about the relative contribution of 
technological change to the production growth in Chinese agriculture. Huang and Rozelle (1996) explore 
this issue with respect to rice. They suggest that technology adoption (adoption of hybrids and the move 
to double cropping) was the most important determinant of yield growth during 1978–84, accounting for 
nearly 40 percent of the change. They find that 35.6 percent of the rice yield improvements were due to 
the HRS (Huang and Rozelle 1996, 362). They acknowledge that institutional innovation may have 
contributed more to the growth in agricultural output generally, the topic of the studies by Lin and others 
noted above.
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Fan, Zhang, and Zhang (2004, 408) raises another important question: the role played by decades 
of public investment in the success of the growth after the rural reforms. They suggest that the economic 
reforms that began in the late 1970s could not have achieved such rapid economic growth and poverty 
reduction had there not been several prior decades of massive government investments in rural 
infrastructure, especially in irrigation, from 1953–76.
 Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle (2007, 19) note that Fan (1991) and Huang and Rozelle 
(1996) conclude that accounting for technological change, institutional change during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s contributed about 30 percent of output growth.  
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Sorting out the relative role of the various measures is difficult because they interact and re-
enforce one another. But there is a broad consensus built on solid survey data and sophisticated 
econometric analysis that the institutional reform creating the HRS was the primary factor responsible for 
remarkable output growth between 1978 and 1984, accounting for roughly 40–60 percent of that growth.  
 Investments in infrastructure and research and 
development were slow in the 1980s, but major investments in education after 1978 resulted in a 
substantial improvement in labor quality. Fan, Zhang, and Zhang argue that public investment played a 
significant role in the growth of agriculture and poverty reduction during 1978–84, accounting for 12 
percent of growth and 45 percent of poverty reduction. They concur, however, that 60 percent of 
production growth in Chinese agriculture between 1978 and 1984 was due to the rural reforms.  
                                                       
18 Lin (1991) reviews adoption of hybrid rice in Hunan Province and the impact of the introduction of the HRS on adoption. 
He finds that during the collective period, adoption of hybrids did not correspond to economic rationality and was the result of 
political promotion. After the transition, economic rationality (farmer costs and benefits) became the major factor in adoption. 
Adoption of hybrids continued to rise, although the reforms slowed it by disrupting the network consisting of the county, brigade, 
and team research and extension.  
19 Gulati, Fan, and Dafali (2005, 8) note that after 1953 top priority in public investment was assigned to irrigation, which 
grew at an impressive rate in the pre-reform period. Irrigated area as a percentage of arable land grew from 23.3 percent in 1953 
to 26.2 percent in 1957, an increase of 5 million hectares during the first five-year plan period. Ling (1991, 106) indicates that up 
to the end of 1983, in the administrative district of Laouyang Prefecture in Henan Province alone, government invested Y 450 
million, to complete 1 billion cubic meters of earth and stone work. A total of 40,000 projects for flood control, drainage, water 
and soil conservation, electric power works, and irrigation were carried out.   
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These impressive levels of agricultural output growth could not be maintained. While overall 
agricultural growth rates averaged 7.9 percent during 1978–84, they dropped to 4.1 percent during 1984–
87, still better than the 2.9 percent for 1952–78 but a clear decline (Lin 1992, 35). The decline after 1984 
is attributed by Lin (1992, 87) to the drop in the rate of growth for fertilizer use from 8.9 percent during 
1978–84 to 3.7 percent during 1984–87. There was also a swift outflow of labor from the cropping sector. 
The growth rate of the agricultural labor force dropped to 2.9 percent in 1984–87, compared with 8.6 
percent during 1978–84. These declines were due in part to a sharp reduction in state procurement prices. 
After 1985, although agriculture still grew at the respectable rate of 4.1 percent, the boom in crop 
production came to an end; the outputs of grain and cotton declined with decreased amounts of land under 
cultivation. Because the Chinese leadership had long been “grain fundamentalists” who saw self-
sufficiency in grain as a central national security concern, some questioned the reform process and even 
led to discussions among the leadership of possible re-collectivization; at the same time others used these 
decreases in production to argue that the reform needed to be carried to its conclusion by full privatization 
(Lin 1992, 3).  
Income and Poverty Impacts  
Per capita income increased to Y 522 in 1984 from Y 220 in 1978, a growth of 15 percent per year in real 
income per capita at 1990 prices, contrasting sharply with the pace of the pre-reform period of 2.3 percent 
per year (Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004, 396; Gulati, Fan, and Dafali 2005, 15). Lin (2003, 311), deducting 
for price factors, estimates that productive net income per capita increased from Y 166.39 to Y 291.10, 
while per capita cash-in-hand plus the outstanding amount of the savings deposit in rural areas (year-end) 
increased from Y 26.6 to Y 85.3. Between 1978 and 1983, per capita rural income more than doubled, 
rising from Y133.6 in 1978 to Y 310 in 1983, significantly improving in relation to urban incomes (Table 
4, taken from Renwei 1993,82).  
Table 4. Per capita income of rural and urban households 
  Income per capita 
(yuan) 
Year  Rural  Urban  Ratio of urban to rural incomes 
1957  73  254  3.48 
1964  102  243  2.38 
1978  134  316  2.36 
1979  160  377  2.36 
1980  191  439  2.30 
1981  223  500  2.24 
1982  270  535  1.98 
1983  310  573  1.85 
1984  355  660  1.86 
1985  398  749  1.88 
1986  424  910  2.15 
1987  463  1,012  2.19 
1988  545  1,192  2.19 
1989  602  1,388  2.31 
1990  630  1,523  2.42 
Sources: Renwei 1993, 82; Ling 1991; State Statistical Bureau various years; State Statistical Bureau 1984b.  
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Some household income continued to come from collective activities, but this decreased radically 
over the same period. In 1978, 66.3 percent of family income derived from the agricultural collective and 
only 26.8 percent from family production, while in 1989, 82.2 percent of family income came from 
family commodity production and only 9.4 percent from the collective sector (Zong 1993, 282).  
Ling (1991, 155) notes that the rate of growth in peasant average per capita income (at constant 
prices) still increased by 2.1, 9.8, and 7.1 percent in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. Ling makes an 
important point: those increases were due not just to increases in farm output and rises in prices of farm 
products, but to an increase in the number of income sources, notably from employment in rural industries 
or housing construction. Still, even in 1998, agriculture accounted for 60 percent of rural household 
income (Oi 1999, 622).  
How did these increases in income affect poverty levels in China? In the 20-year period after 
1981, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line fell from 53 percent to 8 percent. Half 
the decline in poverty came in the first few years of the 1980s. In 1980, a staggering 98 percent of China’s 
poor lived in the rural areas, and the bulk of the dramatic reduction in poverty during the first years of that 
decade came from rural areas. The rural poverty rate as calculated by the Chinese government fell from 
76 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 1985. Between 1980 and 1985, relative inequality between rural mean 
income and urban mean income fell to less than half its 1980 level, flattening out in 1985–90, and rising 
again to 1980 levels during in the 1990s. Agricultural growth did more to reduce poverty and inequality 
than either the secondary or tertiary sectors. The share of the urban population in poverty rose from 19 
percent in 1980 to 39 percent in 2002 (Ravallion and Chen 2004, 1–7, 52). 
A World Bank publication (Harrold 1992, 20) gives somewhat different figures, but it also points 
to a dramatic decline in poverty during the relevant period. It indicates that the proportion of the 
population below the poverty line declined from 22 percent in 1978 to less than 10 percent by the middle 
of the 1980s. By 1990, some 11.5 percent of the rural population and 0.4 percent of the urban population 
remained in poverty, but still, more than 160 million people had emerged from poverty during the reform 
era.  
How were the increases in income distributed? One of the issues raised concerning the HRS 
reforms has been the extent to which they have worsened inequality in incomes. Working off such a 
radically egalitarian and relatively uniform livelihood base as that in rural China, it seems likely that the 
reforms would have increased inequality, and researchers ask to what degree this was the case. In fact, the 
distribution of income improved by most measures during the early part of the reform period, as average 
incomes rose substantially with only a modest increase in inequality. The Gini coefficient of income 
distribution in the rural areas declined steadily from 0.32 in 1978 to 0.22 in 1982, but thereafter inequality 
began to increase and the Gini coefficient rose to 0.34 in 1988 and on to 0.42 in 1995 (Zong 1993,78, 
Griffen, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002) (see Table 5).  
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Table 5. Comparison of inequality, 1978–86 
Two World Bank estimates of rural Gini ratios 
  (1)  (2)   
1978  …  0.32   
1979  0.257  0.28   
1980  0.237  0.26   
1981  0.231  0.23   
1982  0.225  0.22   
1983  …  0.25   
1984  …  0.27   
1985  …  0.30   
1986  …  0.31   
Sources: Khan et al. 1993, 61; Column 1: World Bank 1985, 29-30; Column 2: Calculations made by a World Bank working 
group on Poverty in Developing Counties, quoted in Ahmad and Wang, 1991, 46.  
It appears that the disparities in incomes that developed after 1982 were due to more efficient 
utilization of resources or differences in production capacity or the amount of physical inputs (Ling 1991, 
110, 124). Following the introduction of market mechanisms, regional income disparities among farm 
households did grow and social tensions were acerbated, but the inequality was not very pronounced and 
was more equal than the distribution of nonfarm income (Ling 1991, 147, 154). Still, jealousy of wealthy 
villages and extortion by cadres increased (Zong 1993, 78).  
Griffen, Khan, and Ickowitz (2002, 312) ask whether the rise in income inequality after 1988 was 
one of the consequences of restoring a household farming system. Working with land holdings adjusted 
or unadjusted for irrigation, they recalculate the Gini coefficient for 1988 and 1995. They find that the 
distribution of land became more equal between 1988 and 1995. It was not the HRS reform, they 
conclude, that was the source of growing inequality in rural incomes after 1988, but the growing 
inequality in nonfarm sources of rural incomes (Table 6.) Fan, Zhang, and Zhang (2004, 397) attribute 
this worsening inequality to a growing differential in rural nonfarm opportunities among regions. Writing 
more recently, Khan and Riskin (2005) and Yingying, Hua, and Harrel (2008) reach the same conclusion: 
the greatest factor contributing to the development of regional inequality in rural incomes was rural 
enterprise. In earlier stages, wages from rural industry were the key factor, but by 1995 ownership of rural 
small businesses emerged as the greatest source of rural income inequality. Assets, they note, have 
replaced labor as the source of income inequality.
20
   
  
                                                       
20 While most researchers conclude that the reduction in poverty in the years after 1978 was due to the rural reforms, Fan, 
Zhang, and Zhang (2004, 408) caution against neglecting the contribution of long-standing and massive public investment in 
rural infrastructure. They suggest that more than 45 percent of poverty reduction during 1978–84 could be traced to public 
investment and that this percentage rose to 94.2  percent in 1985–2000.   
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Table 6. Distribution of land and income in rural China, 1988 and 1995 
  1988  1995 
Gini coefficient     
   Income  0.34  0.42 
   Unadjusted land  0.50  0.43 
   Adjusted land  0.47  0.41 
Concentration ratio     
  Farm income  n.a.  0.24 
   Unadjusted land  0.02  0.00 
   Adjusted land  0.06  0.05 
Source: Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002, 312.  
Analyses by Fan, Zhang, and Zhang (2004), while suggesting that the impact of the HRS on 
agricultural growth may have been overstated in some studies due to the neglect of other contributing 
factors, confirm that more than 51 percent of rural poverty reduction can be attributed to these reforms.  
Food and Nutrition Impacts 
Hardly any improvement took place in average Chinese per capita food consumption between 1957 and 
1974. An official estimate puts the number of people who “suffered from a lack of grain” at more than 
100 million in 1977 (Smil 1986, 25). Table 7 presents per capita availability of basic foodstuffs from 
1949 to 1984 (Smil 1986, 27).  
Table 7. Per capita availability of basic foodstuffs in China, 1949–84 
Commodity  1949
a  1952  1957  1961  1965  1970  1977  1983  1984 
Rice
b  89.8  120.3  136.1  81.2  122.7  134.4  136.3  165.5  172.9 
Wheat
b  25.5  31.9  37.1  21.6  35.3  35.7  43.5  79.8  85.1 
Corn
b  …-  29.6  33.6  …  33.1  40.4  52.3  66.9  … 
Soybeans  9.4  16.7  15.8  9.4  8.6  10.6  7.7  9.6  9.4 
Oilseeds
c  4.7  7.4  6.6  2.7  5.0  4.6  4.2  10.3  11.6 
Sugar  0.4  0.8  1.3  0.6  2.0  1.6  1.9  3.7  3.6 
Fruit  2.2  4.3  5.1  4.3  4.5  4.6  6.0  9.3  ... 
Meat
d  …  5.9  6.3  2.9
e  7.7  7.3  8.2  13.8  14.8 
Aquatic products
f  0.9  2.9  4.9  3.5  4.1  3.9  5.0  5.3  5.9 
Sources: Smil 1986, 27; Statistical Yearbook of China 1984; State Statistical Bureau 1985. 
 Notes: Ellipses (…) = not available in published statistics.  
a. All figures on availability are divided by the population at midyear except for 1949, for which the year-end figure is used. 
b. Output is unprocessed grain. 
c. Includes peanuts, rapeseed, sesame seed, sunflower seed, and other minor seeds. Currently, about 45 percent of soybean 
production is also used  
to press oil. 
d. Includes pork, mutton, and beef. 
e. Figure is for 1962. 
f. Includes fish, shellfish, and seaweeds. 
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Box 1. Follow the Eggs 
In the early years of the reform it was the quantities and varieties of food in the home, shop, and market 
which so impressed the long-time observer. My own appraisal of the reforms in their early years was very 
much influenced by an acknowledgement that that quantity of food and quality of diet had improved 
immeasurably for a goodly portion of the population. Although peasant farmers had previously cultivated 
grain, grown vegetables, and raised livestock, the production and marketing of these items have brought 
about major changes in diet while at the same time the proportion of rising cash income allocated to food 
is declining. In villages, one of my yardsticks for measuring sufficiency for years was whether the 
household consumed or sold the eggs of their few chickens – now that is an appropriate indicator only in 
very poor regions. Although village studies show that some poor households and villages are far from 
receiving sufficient food supplies, for the majority of peasant farmers per capita consumption of grain, 
meat, eggs, milk, fish, vegetables and fruit has improved immeasurably (Croll 1994, 216). 
Piazza (1983) has data from 1950–81, a few years into the HRS. Working with a 1979 estimated 
energy requirement of 2,160 kilocalories (kcal) per day, he finds that energy as a percentage of 
requirements reached 100 percent for the first time in 1972, increasing by 4 percent in the following four 
years, then by 12 percent in the four years of the HRS reforms for which he has data (1978–81). Working 
with an estimate of net protein utilization of 2.8 grams per day, he finds that, whereas in 1972 it ranged 
between 104 and 123 percent and was 122 percent in 1978, in 1979–81 it was between 140 and 143 
percent.  
By 1984 per capita availability of rice was 30 percent above the 1977 level. A 1975 survey gave 
an average of 2,188 kcal a day, and by 1983, Smil’s estimate of per capita availability was 2,450 kcal in 
the villages and 2,150 kcal in the cities, for a national average of 2,380 kcal a day, though he notes that 
there were major regional differences (Smil 1986, 34). He estimates that in 1983, 100 million peasants 
(11 percent of the population) were consuming fewer than 2,100 kcal/day, which he considers a 
minimum; another 90–100 million were only slightly above that minimum, at about 2,200 kcal per day 
(Smil 1986, 25, 39). At the same time, variety in the Chinese diet was improving. After 1978, 
consumption of secondary foods (foods other than grain) rose rapidly (Wakashiro 1989, 18–19; Harrold 
1992, 19). Areas sown to various crops reflected this change. In the years immediately following 1978, 
area sown to grains declined by 8 percent, compared with an increase of the area devoted to economic 
(nonquota) crops of 40 percent (Vermeer 1989, 85) (Tables 8 to 10). Looking at the bigger picture, 
Burgess (1997, 333) points out that the universal and egalitarian access to land in rural China was critical 
to these mass increases in caloric intake, especially the large areas of China in which residents faced food 
markets characterized by high transaction costs.
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21 Huang and Rozelle (1995, 38) remind us that rural food consumption behavior responds not only to changes in prices and 
income, but according to different levels of market development in the communities involved. They found that greater market 
development led to systematic declines in the amount of grain and vegetable consumption by farmers and increases in their 
demand for meat and fish.  
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Table 8. Per capita calorific intake, 1965–80 





















Grain  215.0  1,806.0  23.01  1,940.4  251.0  2,108.8 
Meat  7.7  65.4  8.7  75.5  11.1*  94.6 
Milk  …  …  1.0  1.6  1.3*  2.3 
Eggs  1.4  5.5  2.0  7.6  2.3  8.7 
Aquatic 
products 
3.3  4.0  3.5  4.2  4.0*  4.8 
Edible 
oils 
1.7  43.2  1.6  40.1  2.3  57.7 
Sugar  1.7  18.3  3.4  37.2  3.8  41.3 
Others  …  110.9  …  120.3  …  131.8 
Total  …  2,053.3  …  2,226.9  …  2,450.0 
Source: Wakashiro 1989, 18–19. 
Table 9. Per capita annual consumption of key foodstuffs (kg) 
  Edible grain  Meat  Eggs  Milk  Aquatic products  Edible 
oils 
Sugar  Alcohol 
1965  183  7.67  1.42  …  3.33  1.72  1.68  1.30 
1978  196  8.86  1.97  0.95  3.50  1.60  3.42  2.57 
1979  207  11.05  2.08  …  3.22  1.96  3.56  2.98 
1980  214  12.79  2.27  1.4  3.41  2.30  3.83  3.41 
1981  220  12.77  2.44  1.5  3.57  2.94  4.10  4.42 
1982  226  13.81  2.53  1.9  3.85  3.54  4.42  5.25 
1983  232  14.64  2.96  2.2  4.02  4.03  4.47  5.81 
1984  251  15.62  3.91  2.5  4.36  4.70  4.88  6.59 
1985  254  16.87  4.98  2.7  4.89  5.13  5.63  7.69 
1986  256  17.74  5.27  3.2  5.40  5.24  6.12  9.08 
1987  251  17.69  5.56  3.5  5.54  5.66  6.66  10.50 
Sources: From Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1988, 803, with the exception of the figure for milk for 1978, which is from Yan 
Ruizhen 1981, and for 1980 to 1987, Cheng Xu 1988. 
Notes: Edible grain is "commodity grain" and includes amounts consumed as processed products that use various grains as 
materials. Therefore, grain used for making alcohol is included in the edible grain in this table. Meat includes pork, beef, mutton, 
and fowl. 
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Table 10. Consumption indicators, 1978 and 1988 
Indicator  1978  1988  1988 as % of 1978 
Cloth (m sq./person/year)  8.0  12.2  152   
Housing space (m sq./person)         
   Urban  4.2  8.8  210   
   Rural  8.1  16.6  205   
Wristwatches  8.5  47.0  553   
Bicycles  7.7  30.4  395   
Food (kg/person/year)         
   Pork  7.7  14.9  194   
   Poultry  0.4  1.8  438   
   Eggs  2.0  5.8  291   
Source: Harrold 1992, 19; China Statistical Yearbook various years. 
Did household food plots play a significant role in these increases in food availability and 
nutrition levels? The land reformed in the HRS was the collective land, which had been used primarily for 
marketed quota production. Much of the food supply of rural households had long come from the 
household food plot, that small but intensively utilized plot of land over which families, even during most 
of the commune period, had management control. Responsibility (collective) land is 84.5 percent of 
cultivated land, while the private plots are only about 6 percent of cultivated land (Rozelle et al. 2005, 
124). References to these plots in the literature suggest they constituted 5–7 percent of farmland and 
contributed 10–30 percent of household income, with most in the 15–20 percent range Mead (2000). In a 
study of commune agriculture in the early 1960s, Burki (1969, 38) notes that yields on private plots 
average more than twice the collective yield. The few available sources indicate that 10–20 percent of 
peasant time was spent on these plots, and according to one source, 13 percent of fertilizer was applied to 
them (Mead 2000).  
Mead (2000) argues that this was an inefficient allocation of labor and inputs from a community 
(if not a household) perspective, and he asks how much of the increase in China’s agricultural output 
between 1980 and 1984 can be explained by efficiency gains when farmers shifted labor and other inputs 
from these plots to their contract land. He estimates that eliminating the favoritism of private plots could 
potentially have created an average overall production increase of 18.8 percent. But a number of field 
studies from around the same time indicate that household food plots still received more labor and land-
building inputs than responsibility land, probably because these plots had greater tenure security, not 
being subject to periodic reallocation (Li, Rozelle, and Brandt 1998; Li, Rozelle, and Huang 2000).  
Impacts on Population and Public Services 
A key unanticipated impact of the reforms relates to household growth. The HRS, by allocating land 
according to household size, gave households the incentive to have more children. In addition, a larger 
family was allocated more land, could produce more, and had surplus labor whose members could move 
into employment in rural industry. The one-child policy was introduced in 1980. This is not to suggest 
that the policy was initiated to counter the impact of the HRS reform on population, but the reform has 
been seen by some commentators as one factor in the population growth that the policy sought to address 
(Renwei 1993, 76–77). The one-child policy has been relatively successful in urban areas but, in spite of 
sporadic if draconian attempts to enforce it, has largely failed in rural areas. Incentive structures of 
households are quite different in rural and urban areas, and government exercises more effective social 
control in urban than in rural areas (Zong 1993, 287).
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22 For a full discussion of the relationship between economic reforms and fertility in China, see Zhang 2002. 
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Education was also affected, quite seriously. Many peasant families withdrew their children from 
school to help in their new economic activities. After the rural reform of 1978, the absolute number of 
students attending secondary school in rural areas declined from 48.2 million students to 27.2 million in 
1989. The number of rural junior middle schools was cut in half between 1978 and 1989 while the 
number of rural senior middle schools was reduced to 14 percent of what it was in 1978.  
In addition, the commune’s medical insurance system collapsed, and local governments failed to 
pick up the slack. Many of China’s famous “barefoot doctors” went into more lucrative work (Zong 1993, 
284, 288).  
These effects were transient and to some extent the result of policy reforms unconnected to the 
content of the HRS reforms. The declines in schooling in part reflected slippage in the transition from 
schooling provided by the commune to schooling provided by local governments, and earlier levels of 
students in school were regained and improved over time. The change in provision of medical services, 
however, reflects the beginning of a reform that increasingly has asked citizens to rely on private medical 
services and insurance to meet their health needs. Some of these impacts were harbingers of policy 
changes driven by broader considerations as China managed its transition to markets, and it is not 
appropriate to assess them simply as effects of the introduction of the HRS. 
Property Rights Reform Impacts 
The primary thrusts of the property rights reforms have been to reduce periodic reallocation of holdings, 
to extend the terms of use rights, and to enhance the marketability of the use right. In contrast to the HRS 
reforms, no consensus has emerged among researchers as to the benefits of these reforms. Ideology and 
policy preferences for a more or less egalitarian rural society drive an ongoing debate, which Li, Rozelle, 
and Brandt (1998, 64) correctly describe as “vitriolic.”  
Some argue that weak and incomplete land rights due to reallocations and restrictions on rentals 
and other transactions weaken incentives for investments and prevent consolidation of fragmented 
holdings. They urge greater strengthening of land rights (Wen 1995; Carter and Yao 2004; Zhou 1994; 
Feder et al. 1992; and Prosterman, Ping, and Zhu 2004). Similarly, Zhang, Li, and Shao (2006, 621–622) 
are concerned that the HRS has become an obstacle to the development of larger-scale, mechanized grain 
production. As labor becomes more expensive, they urge increased transferability of the farmland use 
right to allow specialized grain-producing households to enlarge the size of their farms. Zhu and 
Prosterman (2007) make a strong case for moving forward on property right reforms.  
Others (Kung 1995; Kung and Liu 1996; and Dong 1996) suggest that gains from greater 
liberalization would not be great, and that farmers themselves do not favor privatization, because they 
value the assured land access they enjoy under collective ownership. They argue that administrative 
allocation is often economically rational, favoring efficiency, and urge that China is not ready for full 
liberalization of the market in land rights, given that credit markets are undeveloped, there is no land 
registration system, and the legal system is incomplete.  
The debate can be seen as one over how a balance should be struck between the production or 
social security functions of land, both legitimate functions, and how quickly or slowly that balance should 
shift. What empirical studies have addressed these issues?  
Estimating Economic Impacts 
Studies of the impact of these property rights reforms are complicated by the fact that the reforms have 
been highly incremental and that implementation has lagged well behind party pronouncements and laws. 
A 17-province survey studied implementation of the 30-year land use rights under the 1998 Land 
Management Law in a 17- province survey. It found that in spite of the absolute prohibition on land 
readjustments during the 30-year term for land use rights, just under half of the respondents had received 
the land use right contracts as mandated by the 1998 law, and “many contracts contained provisions that 
were inconsistent with or in direct violation of national laws and policies governing land readjustments.” 
One in five farmers reported that their village had indeed conducted a land readjustment since the  
29 
implementation of the 30-year rights (Prosterman, Schwartzwalder, and Jianping 2000, 524–525). These 
differences reflect the fact that in what is a de facto highly decentralized system, decisionmaking on 
implementation largely resides with local and village authorities, rather than the central government 
(Carter and Yao 2005).  
The studies thus seek to explore the impact of property rights by searching out contrasting levels 
of such rights in different types of plots or in different villages, given that implementation has gone 
further in some areas than others, and comparing behavior.  
Deininger and Jin (2002) examine the impact of stronger land tenure rights in Guizhou Province 
in the south, which resulted from the province-wide replication of elements in the 1987 Meitan pilot 
reform between 1994 and 1997. They find that more secure land rights had a significant and positive 
impact on farmer investment on upland fields, though not on paddy land. They also found an active rental 
market in use rights (subleases) and suggest that being able to transfer land could have a major impact on 
agricultural investment. The right to transfer use rights through subleasing is also important, they argue, 
because this right allows retention of land while having an off-farm job. As to villager preferences 
regarding reforms, they find a strong learning effect; with overall economic development, the support for 
prohibition of reallocation increases significantly (Deininger and Jin 2002, 15, 22–24). They obtained 
similar results in a later study in which they tested for the impact of adequate compensation for land taken 
through reallocations (Deininger and Jin 2007). 
Another dimension to marketability of use rights concerns its potential to address the rigid 
smallholding structure of Chinese agriculture and the fragmented nature of most farmed holdings. It is 
often suggested that fragmentation prevents farmers from using indivisible capital items and suggests that 
earlier marketability of land use rights could allow farmers to consolidate holdings though transactions, 
thus achieving some economies of scale (see, for example, Zhang, Li, and Shao 2006). Tan, Qu, and 
Heerink (2005, 225) find that fragmentation is largely supply-driven, but the demand side is affected as 
well. Households in areas with less access to markets were found to prefer fragmented holdings, so that 
they could spread risks, crop types, and household labor; stronger demand for consolidation comes with 
greater market access.  
What returns would accrue to consolidation of holdings and creation of larger-scale holdings? 
Feder et al. (1992, 17, 21–23) found no increasing returns to scale when typical farms were in the range of 
0.5–2.0 hectares, suggesting that economies of scale from indivisibility of capital may have been 
exhausted as farms exceeded 0.5 hectare. They speculate that, for the smallest holdings, size may in part 
explain the much greater investment in housing than in farmland, suggesting that for those holdings, 
customized draft services or share ownership of capital assets has not been able to overcome capital 
divisibility problems. But they find that this effect does not appear to exist above 0.5 hectare, and so they 
decline to recommend a significant scaling-up. 
Other studies tend to confirm that more secure and more transferable property rights would have 
a positive impact, but the issue of the extent of that impact and the appropriate timing remains. A study of 
130 farmers in Fengning County of Hebei Province in northern China found that the right to use land for 
long periods encouraged land-saving investments (Li, Rozelle, and Brandt 1998, 65, 70). Private plots 
(household food plots) had 13 percent higher yields and received 18 percent more labor and 14–32 
percent more inputs (depending on the input) than collective parcels. The authors note that private plots 
are sometimes of better quality and nearer villages, and this may account in part for the differences. 
Testing for how long parcels had been held for a security-of-tenure effect on inputs, they found that it 
made no difference with respect to short-term inputs such as labor, nitrogen, and animal traction, but it 
did affect longer-term inputs such as organic manure and phosphate fertilizer. While the results show that 
land tenure affects agricultural production decisions, the difference between collective and private plots, 
they caution, is small compared to the private plot–communal land productivity gap that existed in the 
pre-reform period. Overall, the authors conclude, the differentials are small and may be outweighed by 
the social insurance role played by collective ownership.  
A household study in Hebei and Liaoning in north and northeast China compares plots held for 
longer or shorter periods of time (Li, Rozelle, and Huang 2000, 8–16). The average length of tenure was  
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about 21 years for private plots, but 9 years for responsibility plots. On average, farmers used more inputs 
and produced higher yields on their private plots, and private plot yields were about 24 percent higher. 
Farmers applied more labor, animal traction, and fertilizers on private plots and generally more inputs on 
plots held longer. The authors conclude that while tenure rights had a significant and positive effect on 
yields, it was small. Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002), again working with data from northeast China, 
explore the impact of reallocation-induced tenure insecurity on investment, focusing on organic fertilizer 
use because it is understood to have long-term effects on soil quality (as opposed to chemical fertilizers). 
While the higher risk of land taking significantly reduced application of organic fertilizer, their welfare 
analysis suggests that guaranteeing land tenure in this part of China would yield only small efficiency 
gains. Rozelle et al. (2005) use data from the same region, assessing tenure security in terms of the rights 
enjoyed by farmers in particular villages. They conclude (2005, 165) that providing households with 
immunity against administrative reallocations boosts investment in land by four hours per mu. The above 
three studies conclude that the potential impacts of strengthening tenure security in this region would be 
small. Citing Dong (1997, 19), they suggest that this may be because most capital-intensive agricultural 
investments, such as canal irrigation, drainage, and terracing projects, are undertaken at the village, not 
the individual, level (Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle 2002, 1444).  
Moreover, these three studies take a more sanguine view of administrative allocation than most 
authors. Whereas they agree with Johnson (1995) that reallocation is driven by egalitarianism and rent-
seeking by local cadres, they suggest that reallocation is also a form of “village profit maximization.” 
They note a study that suggests that demographic variables and village dummies explain 75 percent of the 
variation in household landholdings (Burgess 1997, 134-135). Turner, Brandt, and Rozelle (1998) also 
found a rational village in which land reallocations seek efficiency within the equity framework.  
Rozelle et al. (2005, 165) describe forging a modest efficiency gain from enhanced property 
rights as an implicit premium for the social insurance provided by collective ownership, with its highly 
egalitarian distribution. Arguing along the same lines as in their 2000 paper and citing Kung (1995), they 
conclude that tenure strengthening is not urgent, and it is important that alternatives for the social security 
function of egalitarian land distribution first be found.  
Under the concern about substituting markets for administrative allocations lies an assumption 
that many rural households, if allowed greater marketability of their rights, would soon render themselves 
landless. But recent research from Vietnam (Benjamin, Brandt and Giles 2004) suggests that the 
anticipated growth in landless households has not eventuated in Vietnam because land was quasi-
privatized. Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle (2007, 29) urge both implementation of an alternative rural social 
security system and continued progress toward privatization of rural land. The two are in fact necessary 
complimentary measures, and both can be undertaken if China is prepared to make the needed investment 
in its rural areas.
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Democratization of village governance structures, a process begun in a limited way, could 
provide a path out of this policy bind, letting community institutions make key choices about privatization 
of land rights. This would replicate the approach taken at the initiation of the HRS. The results, the 
authors suspect, would be somewhat different in parts of the country where the social security role of land 
is now less important and those in which it continues to be critical.  
  
As for the HRS reforms, those analyzing reform impacts with the benefit of hindsight will need to 
decide what portion of growth and poverty reduction has been due to property rights reforms. There are 
already important contenders for a critical role in those processes. After massive investments in 
infrastructure, especially irrigation, in the period before the HRS reform, public investment in agriculture 
declined. Feder et al. (1992, 2) note that from 1979, when the HRS began to spread rapidly, the 
government’s investment in agriculture declined from Y 6.24 billion to Y 3.43 billion in 1983 and 
partially recovered to only Y 4.68 billion in 1987. Meanwhile, collectives’ investments decreased from Y 
8.71 billion in 1979 to Y 2.07 billion in 1985. Zhang (1998, 52) provides somewhat different figures on 
collective investment, but these suggest the same trend: collective investment in agriculture was Y 5.2 
                                                       
23 For a strong brief by a legal scholar for privatization, highlighting its financial implications, see Palomar 2002.  
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billion in 1982 but decreased to Y 2.1 billion by 1985. At constant prices, budgetary outlays on 
agricultural investments (mainly on infrastructure) declined from 11.3 percent of total government outlay 
in 1978 to only 7.5 percent in 1987 (Kung 1992, 166), and investment in irrigation in 1989 was only 44 
percent of that in 1976 (Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004, 399). Vermeer (1989, 85–86) makes the point that 
in the post-Mao era, the growth of the effectively irrigated area has stagnated, which he attributes in part 
to declining public investment. Both the slowing of irrigation growth and the decline in agricultural 
infrastructure may, however, constitute a response to the increasing efficiency in use of existing farmland, 
in which case they are appropriate responses. 
Public investment, however, has not been limited to infrastructure. As noted above, Fan, Zhang, 
and Zhang (2004) have suggested that the growth in 1978–84 (immediately after the HRS reforms) owed 
more to the earlier public investments than has been acknowledged. They further suggest that for the 
period 1985–2000, the contribution of public investment to growth was 63 percent, and public investment 
was the largest source of production growth and poverty reduction. Irrigation development in this period 
had only a modest impact on growth in agricultural production, but the expenditure on education had a 
major impact, and spending on research and extension also improved agricultural production 
substantially. Government spending on rural telecommunications, electricity, and roads also had a 
substantial marginal impact on poverty reduction.  
It may take some time before a consensus is reached on the prospective effects of the property 
rights reforms and other factors on production, income, and welfare in the years after 1990. There will be 
less progress to attribute. The terms of trade have run against rural areas since 1990 and the gap between 
rural and urban incomes has further widened. In addition, inequality among incomes within and among 
rural areas has increased. The deterioration in the economic performance in the last half of the 1990s left 
as much as half of the rural population not much better off than 12 years earlier, and the bottom 5 percent 
were worse off (Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles 2005, 820).  
In the meantime, some other, unanticipated effects of the property rights reforms have become 
clear. This is not unusual. Because land is a multipurpose resource, land reforms tend to have many 
repercussions. Rural industrialization could be characterized fairly as an unanticipated impact of the 
introduction of the HRS, having its origin in ad hoc attempts to employ surplus released from a more 
efficient agriculture. Such unanticipated impacts may affect a large part of the intended beneficiary 
population, as in the case of women, discussed below, or more narrowly defined groups.  
Gendered Impacts  
While male and female family members may both benefit from land reforms, it is not unusual for land 
reforms to also have gendered impacts. They often place women at a disadvantage in some respects. In 
much of the postsocialist world, the land reforms vesting land in households have in fact meant vesting 
land in the male household head and so strengthened patriarchal family control (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
1997). To what extent has this been the case in China, which prides itself on legal guarantees of gender 
equality?  
Li (1993) explains that women had in theory participated as equals in collective agriculture under 
the commune system, though women were typically employed in more menial positions and largely 
excluded from management. In the conversion to the HRS, households received land according to their 
labor supply. Wives and adult daughters were counted for this purpose, though sometimes given a lesser 
value than male labor. In the first decade of the system, one of the adjustments made in periodic 
reallocations was to adjust family holdings to reflect changes in family size and marriages. Rural people 
follow the cong fu ju marriage custom, prevalent throughout China, in which a young man marries a girl 
from outside his home village and his bride comes to live with his family in his village. When the new 
wife arrives, the land allocation of the family she joined would at the next opportunity be increased 
accordingly. She would not receive a discrete parcel of land, but her presence would be counted in 
determining the overall landholding of the family. Wives and daughters, like other family members, 
shared in the many benefits of the HRS.   
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The reforms changed this. Rural industrialization, made possible by the labor surplus revealed by 
HRS, began to change the roles of women in their households. In Hebei Province, the number of part-time 
agricultural households grew as male labor moved into local jobs in TVEs. By 1992, 25 percent of village 
families farmed part time. In those families, women were almost entirely responsible for agricultural 
production. Tasks formerly done only by husbands (storing grains, food processing, trading produce in 
farmers’ or state markets, building houses and walls, and transporting produce by bike and tractor) 
became shared tasks. Some jobs formerly considered “skilled” came to be considered “unskilled” and 
thus appropriate for women (managing pumps, driving a tractor, making adobe bricks, and feeding draft 
animals). Some activities, however, continued to be reserved for men: setting roof beams when a house is 
built, digging wells, and guiding a plow. These had been the highly “skilled” jobs in the communes, and 
local superstitions held that bad luck would follow if these jobs were done by women. Husbands still 
make important farm management decisions, but now they make them in consultation with their wives, 
and in some households de facto control of farm management has passed to wives (Li 1993, 37–41; 
1997a). 
This pattern, while common in most of the country, was not the universal pattern. Zong (1993, 
286–289) notes that two distinct patterns of family labor division emerged with the agricultural reforms. 
In suburban and coastal regions, men involved themselves in primarily nonagricultural activities, and 
wives or women were responsible for agricultural production. This meant that women’s power and 
control over their labor was partially increased, but at the same time, they were excluded from 
opportunities outside the fields. The second pattern could be found in remote and inland areas: men 
continued to dominate agricultural production and women were marginalized into handicraft and service 
activities. Women, who had at least participated broadly in production activities under the commune 
system, were in both these models more and more focused on home and farm, while men went out to 
work in the “modern” jobs.  
This has resulted in a revival of patriarchal values as economic productivity and living standards 
have improved. “Mercenary marriages,” in which engagement prices set according to the age of the bride 
were paid to obtain wives, have re-emerged (Zong 1993, 286, 289). A similar pattern has emerged with 
respect to inheritance rights. Such rights have far more important implications after the HRS than under 
the commune system, because household assets have increased. There is a stark contrast between the 
equal rights to inheritance given to women by national law and the de facto disenfranchisement of women 
in inheritance under village practice. The prospects for remedying this are not good in the short run, given 
asymmetrical gender power relations. The problem will become more serious because rates of divorce are 
growing (Zhang 2003. 272–273).  
At the same time, the property rights reforms introduced after 1988, as government sought to 
limit periodic land reallocations, affected allocations of land to wives moving to their husbands’ villages. 
They had to wait longer and longer for the family they joined to receive this recognition of their labor 
contribution, and many villages ceased to provide for it altogether. Failure to receive such an allocation 
became an acute disadvantage later in cases of divorce and widowhood; the divorcee or widow was then 
seen as having no land entitlement in the village and was often left landless by the husband’s family and 
the village. Organizations such as the All-China Women’s Federation lobbied for more frequent 
reallocations, recognizing that women were being disadvantaged in the reform. They noted with concern 
that as women took on more responsibility in agriculture, they had less and less satisfactory access to land 
(All-China Women’s Federation 1999).  
This issue became the topic of broad public debate and was tackled directly in the Rural Land 
Contracting Law. The general approach of the new law was presaged in a 1999 interview in the China 
Women’s Daily with Du Runsheng, a pioneer of property rights reform in China (Lu and Chen 1999, 9): 
Equality is important, and so the law gives women equal shares with men. But 
from an efficiency standpoint, it is important that we do not adjust the landholdings too 
often. That’s why when a village distributes land they should not make assumptions 
about whether women will eventually stay or leave their home village; it should be done  
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strictly according to the present population. That’s consistent with the Government’s 
guaranteeing thirty-year land rights, giving people the security they need in land. I have 
learned that there are three situations in which women’s land rights are in danger: (1) 
married women, when they move in; (2) when women marry nonrural residents but stay 
in the rural areas, and (3) when women are divorced. How to solve this problem? 
Women, once they marry and move away, should retain their land in their village of 
origin. Women who marry urban residents, if they still live in the countryside, should 
have a right to land. Divorced women should keep their existing residential registration 
and land use rights. These women must have the right to transfer their use rights to 
others, but they should not be forced to do so. After land has been distributed, and before 
any new adjustment, women in these situations should not receive new land. The only 
way land should be shifted from one person to another, between redistributions, is by 
voluntary transactions. 
The Rural Land Contracting Law follows this pattern, stipulating in Article 30: 
When a woman marries during the contract term, the contract-issuing party 
cannot take back her original contracted land unless she receives land where she moves. 
When a woman is divorced or widowed, the contract-issuing party cannot take her land 
back if she still lives at her current place of residence or moves to a new place of 
residence where she cannot get land. 
Li and Bruce (2005) note that although Article 30 does not help young women obtain land rights 
in their husbands’ villages, it does purport to protect their land rights in their parental village when they 
marry and move away (at least until they receive land in the new village, an increasingly unlikely 
eventuality). The benefits that women derive from this provision depends upon the extent to which 
families recognize that their daughter retains an interest in the family land and accept that she should be 
able to derive benefits from it. One authority on women’s land rights (cited in Li and Bruce 2005, 276) 
worried that “women’s claim to their land rights runs against the interest of their family, including father, 
brother, and mother, and means a rebellion against the patriarchal system, a cut-off of the kinship ties . . . 
women who are ready to do so are unlikely to succeed in practice, because it is unlikely that they will get 
any legal support.” On the other hand, Article 30 is potentially helpful to widows and divorcees, though it 
is short on details such as how land is to be partitioned in such situations. Enforcement, as with all legal 
rights in China, is likely to be problematic.  
The impact of rural industrialization on the gender division of labor and responsibility in 
agriculture has already been discussed, but how have women fared with the new TVEs and private 
enterprises? Women are underrepresented among owners of private enterprises, constituting only 21 
percent of this category; the only occupational category in which they are a majority–51 percent–is that of 
farmers (Khan et al. 1993, 43). A study in Hebei Province, however, found that gender roles in the new 
industries varied depending upon industry ownership, industrial product, and scale of industry. In 
privately owned enterprises, mostly family businesses, women were commonly found to be involved in 
management, but this was not the case in collective enterprises. The product also mattered: for example, 
in a clothing industry, women were more likely to be heavily involved and to participate in management 
than in other industries, reflecting a stereotyped identification of the making of clothing as a woman’s 
task. While men were involved in management at all scales of industry, women were notably more 
involved in management in smaller, family-owned enterprises, often in accounting and financial 
management. While movement into industrial jobs did not in itself confer on women increased 
participation in making household decisions, if they participated in management tasks in nonagricultural 
work, they often participated more prominently in household decisionmaking (Li 1997b).   
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4. ASYMMETRIC TENURE REFORM AND ITS IMPACTS 
The HRS reforms are clearly sustainable; the more relevant question today is whether the system is 
flexible enough to respond to changing needs as China’s economy becomes progressively less agrarian. 
No land tenure system is good for all time; it must regularly be re-examined in terms of the role it plays in 
the larger, evolving market economy. In full market economies, land tenure arrangements have a greater 
ability to adjust through the action of markets and contracts, but this is not yet the case in China. Given 
that China is in the middle of an economic system reform process, more reforms in the land tenure system 
may be anticipated. In this context, the government must balance a number of important and to some 
extent conflicting policy objectives.  
Economic growth is clearly the principal objective of policymakers, and land is now making a 
critical contribution to growth processes. But land still plays a critical role as a social security resource. 
Access to farmland for all resident households is the critical safety net for members of rural households 
moving into industry and other nonagricultural sectors. It has come into play recently, as the current 
worldwide recession has reduced the demand for exports from Chinese industry. Migrant laborers, 
released by factory closures, have flowed back into their home rural areas. The desire to maintain this role 
for agricultural land is an important factor in government’s reluctance to allow markets to fully replace 
administrative decisionmaking in determining access to rural farmland. This is the case even though a 
number of authors argue that as the cost of labor grows, rural land markets need to be freed up to allow 
consolidation of microholdings into larger units. Earlier in this paper, several authors cited the social 
security and safety-net role played by rural land as a reason for moving slowly toward full marketability 
of land. It is equally a reason for government to move as rapidly as possible to establish alternative safety 
nets for workers from the rural sector. It should not become an excuse for stalling on property rights 
reforms, which can enhance efficiency in agriculture.  
The arguments for moving faster or slower in extending fuller property rights to China’s rural 
farm households have already been reviewed. However, one dimension of this issue that has not been 
discussed in most of those papers has become a major focus of debate only in the last five years. That is 
the tenure asymmetry that has been created by discrete tenure reform processes in China’s urban and rural 
land sectors. Property rights reforms have moved much more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. Most 
land in urban areas is under rights that are readily marketable and valuable, while most rural land still lies 
outside the market economy, and its value is hard to determine. In the past decades, government has lost 
some of its concern about rapid urbanization and cities have been expanding at a remarkable rate (Deng 
2003). This expansion takes place through cities requisitioning rural land for incorporation into urban 
areas, a process of questionable fairness that has often created intense social stress and local unrest. To 
understand this problem, it is necessary to review briefly the development of urban land tenure in China. .  
Urban land in China
24
As in rural areas, the ownership of land and the ownership of buildings are separate in Chinese 
law. Buildings may be privately owned, but the land on which they stand is owned by the state and made 
available to users on contract from the municipality. Holders of urban land have long-term use rights and 
pay a single, up-front charge when receiving the right to use the land. This pattern was set by the early 
1950s. The statutory term of these use rights has regularly been extended, and the right has been freely 
transferable since a 1988 constitutional amendment allowing transfer of land use rights where provided by 
 is owned by the state, unlike rural land, which is owned by the rural 
collectives. Its management has long been delegated to municipal governments, who allocate this land to 
users. By the mid-1990s, the central government’s approval of allocations of public land was only needed 
for very large pieces of land, the area differing depending on the nature of the land use. Central 
government retained the authority to retrieve public land from local governments for major investment 
projects of national interest. But otherwise, local government units have had full management of public 
land within their boundaries.  
                                                       
24 There are few treatments of urban land tenure in English (see Ding 2003).  
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law. This was followed by an amendment to the same end of Article 43 of the Land Administration Law, 
and then by issuance of regulations (May 19, 1990. Interim Regulations on Selling and Assigning of 
State-owned Urban Land Use Right). These allow “the transfer, lease, mortgaging, inheritance and 
dealing in the state-owned urban land use right for other economic activities, within its use term.” 
Municipalities maintain registers of these land use rights.  
The longest use right available in urban areas is that for residential land, which is for 70 years. 
There is an active market in such land rights, and land values have risen dramatically in recent years, with 
those appreciations in value accruing to the rights holders. This has opened up a major gap between 
legally recognized values of urban and rural land and between asset ownership by rural and urban 
families. This contrast is most pronounced at the interface between the systems, where rural land is 
converted to urban land by requisitioning.  
In the 1990s, demand for new land for urban uses grew rapidly,
25 in part due to a relaxation of 
legal restrictions, which had partitioned the urban and rural economies into water-tight compartments, 
including tight restrictions on urban migration. Local government had some public land to reallocate from 
failed state enterprises but also began to rapidly expand their borders into rural areas, where land was 
owned by rural collectives. The growth has been phenomenal, encouraged by the tenure duality, which 
made rural land remarkably inexpensive. Local governments acquired land compulsorily at statutorily 
specified compensation levels, reflecting agricultural uses and the nonmarketability of that land,
26
This disparity, which is effectively an appropriation by the local government of a legally 
unrecognized location value in such peri-urban land, has become a source of deep resentment in peri-
urban communities facing absorption into municipalities and has been the occasion of serious 
demonstrations and their violent repression in many areas of the country.
 and 
then allocated that land at much higher prices to land developers and end users for urban uses. This 
created a state monopoly of the primary market for urban land.  
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This appropriation of rural land with very limited compensation has generated huge revenues for 
local governments and major opportunities for land developers. It has also generated significant problems 
with management of this land and funds derived from it, which are off-budget local government 
resources. In 1998, the central government approved land banking by local governments. This was done 
initially to facilitate the takeover of land of failed state-owned enterprises, but local government quickly 
learned to use this mechanism to manage large amounts of rural land appropriated for future demand. 
Government units cannot themselves mortgage state land, but a land bank can hold an urban land use 
certificate, and then loans can be secured with its certificate.
 For the sake of social peace 
and to lower social transactions costs, some wealthy cities have begun to pay compensation or provide 
alternative living accommodations in excess of that required by law, or they hold out the carrot of 
conversion of the rural land to the coveted urban hukou (residence permit), allowing holders to live and 
work in an urban area. Similarly, they have sometimes encouraged the enterprises or land developers who 
are to receive the land to negotiate and pay compensation on an informal basis, avoiding legal restrictions 
(Development Research Center and World Bank 2005, iii). Poorer municipalities have found it more 
difficult to offer genuinely attractive compensation. Fraud and abuses by local officials seeking to avoid 
even the minimal compensation requirements by law have been common.  
28
                                                       
25 From 1980 to 2004, the percentage of population classified as urban grew from 19.4 to 41.8 percent (Development 
Research Center and World Bank 2005, 2). 
 This became a common practice by many 
local governments. Given that the banking sector is still largely public, the potential for collusion and 
26 China’s Constitution in Article 10 provides for compulsory taking of property in the public interest subject to fair 
compensation, but the key terms are not defined. Compensation under Article 45 of the Land Administration Law involves three 
required payments: (1) a compensation fee for land, 6 to 10 times the average annual output value of the land for the three years 
prior to the requisition, paid to the collective owner of the land; (2) a resettlement subsidy, also paid to the collective (the 
standard subsidy is 4 to 6 times the average annual output value, with a maximum of 15 times the average annual output value); 
and (3) compensation fees to households for structures and standing crops.  
27 For a study of land loss and conflict in Yunnan Province, see van Rooij 2008. 
28 See the discussion of land banking and use of such mortgages by local governments in Development Research Council 
and World Bank 2005, 23).   
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questionable lending practices are evident. China’s local government units, with their decentralized 
control over state land, have pursued these opportunities vigorously, and the result has been a financial 
windfall. This has driven a huge wave of urban infrastructural development and expansion, funded to a 
large extent from land revenues.
29
This outcome is based in the property rights asymmetry between urban and rural land, which 
originates in the gradualism and incompleteness of the rural reforms. The reference to “asymmetrical 
reform” is from Zhang (2006). Zhang, Li, and Shao (2006, 622) is another source that deals with this 
problem forthrightly,
 The results, as anyone who has visited China in recent years can attest, 
are phenomenal. 
30
… [U]nder the arrangement of fiscal decentralization, local governments 
compete vigorously to offer various protections on the property rights of investors; on the 
other hand, local governments and developers attempt to acquire land at the lowest price 
possible by taking advantage of the loopholes inherent in the Chinese law. Secure 
investor property rights, together with weak protections on individuals’ land property 
rights, are argued to be one of the major drivers of China’s rapid economic growth. But 
the same factor can veer those individuals being deprived of land into violence and social 
unrest, which may undermine China’s social stability and long-term sustainable growth. 
 noting that “The real value of cultivated land is obscured under the present land 
policy and administration” and that the incomplete property rights reform “prevents cultivated land form 
being used for other purposes by the peasants, because the use of the land is confined to agriculture by the 
peasants’ use right contracts.” Zhang (2006, v) note the importance in this regard of the fiscal 
decentralization after 1980 and warn that  
Compensation actually paid is often inadequate even under current legal standards and fails to 
meet the needs of those whose land is taken. The Development Research Center and World Bank (2005, 
11) cite the National Bureau of Statistics figures, indicating that the income of farmers whose lands were 
requisitioned for urban development plummeted by about 46 percent. There are exceptions. For some 
wealthy municipalities, where the value of the land converted to urban is very high, it is easy for the 
municipality to provide compensation, usually in the form of apartments in housing developed under a far 
denser use plan than prevailed before acquisition. It is a modest price for the municipality to pay for a 
large area of prime urban real estate.  
Increasing standards for compensation will not be enough to solve the problem. It is equally 
important that the funds reach those who have actually lost out in the transfer of the land to urban status. 
Funds that are paid out frequently do not reach farmer households. Households receive direct 
compensation for standing crops and homes, but other compensation for loss of future production and 
relocation are paid to the collective owner, rather than its affected members. The collectives have often 
used these funds to create “alternative employment opportunities” for those dispossessed, but the affected 
families commonly do not receive the jobs created (Development Research Center and World Bank 2005, 
11). 
The legally induced, artificially low cost of rural land also represents a threat to China’s 
environment. It has created strong incentives for municipalities to build outward rather than upward. In a 
market economy, land near the urban center will normally be more valuable than on the fringe, but there 
is a gradual value gradient and there are countervailing considerations that slow down the rapidity of the 
                                                       
29 Different studies consistently show that land transfer fees account for at least 20–30 percent of total subnational 
government revenues. Based on a report from the Xinhua News Agency issued on June 24, 2004, total revenues from the land use 
right transfer fee were as high as RMB910 billion in the past three years (about US$110 billion); and in some provinces, the 
transfer fee revenues were higher than the governments’ fiscal revenues (Development Research Center and World Bank 2007, 
15).  
30 The only other current sources that do these topics justice are two thoughtful collaborative reports of the Development 
Research Center and the World Bank (2005; 2007). The author was part of the Bank team for the first report. Unfortunately, the 
reports provide remarkably little quantitative information, beyond some local figures from case studies.  
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spread of urban areas, such as the cost of moving between the fringe and jobs at the city center. In China, 
the price structure facing municipalities, in their capacity as the monopoly appropriator of rural land for 
urban areas, looks not like a gentle gradient but a cliff. As one moves across the urban boundary and into 
rural land, the cost of such land drops precipitously. This threatens fragile natural resources near cities, 
such as wetlands. 
It also runs directly into a strong government policy in favor of conservation of prime farmland. 
This objective is linked to central government officials’ determination to keep China self-sufficient in 
grain, as far as is humanly possible, a “grain fundamentalism.” This security priority is immune to 
considerations of comparative advantage (a number of South Asian countries can produce rice for less 
than China). In spite of this, farmland disappeared at an average rate of 685,000 hectares per year between 
1996 and 2002, and the rate is accelerating (Development Research Center and World Bank (2005, 17). 
Government has repeatedly sought through regulatory approaches to limit loss of farmland, but with 
mixed success. Bruce and Muo (1998), examining the position in coastal Fujian Province, found 
provincial and local government officials quite ready to admit that they prioritized industrial and other 
projects far higher than farmland preservation. Regulatory rules could be evaded, and for local officials 
determined to “develop” their province, were trumped easily by the low cost of rural land. This finding  is 
consistent with those of a recent Development Research Center and World Bank report (2007), which 
warns that “ultimately… evasive techniques will be difficult to suppress if steps are not taken to alter 
fundamentally the economic incentive structures that help drive urban expansion at its current rapid 
pace.”
31
By 2004, the central government had become increasingly concerned about a number of 
urban/peri-urban land issues related to asymmetric land reform: 
  
1.  a tendency of the large revenue stream associated with absorption of rural lands into urban 
areas to drive urban development outward rather than upward, with serious consequences for 
maintaining arable land and negative environmental impacts;  
2.  lack of an adequate legal framework for compensation for rural land absorbed and local 
abuses of the requisition power, both of which are the source of significant peri-urban unrest 
and protests in many parts of the country;  
3.  lack of controls of the use of the huge off-budget funds provided to local governments by 
land allocations and the extensive corruption associated with the use of those funds;  
4.  the practice by some municipalities of using public land in their land banks to secure liberal 
and in many cases questionable loans from state and commercial banks (threatening, in the 
opinion of some commentators, the stability of the banking system); and  
5.  excessive dependence by many municipalities on revenue from one-time charges on land 
when first allocated as urban land, which is likely to prove unsustainable. (A real property tax 
is sometimes discussed as an alternative.)
32
The authors do not want to oversimplify the complexities around the difficult issue of who 
deserves to benefit in what proportion from the appreciation in value of property, which appreciation is 
driven by a variety of direct and indirect forces. There are many claimants. The point here is simpler. 
Urban landholders receive significant benefit from the appreciating value of their land assets, much of 
which has nothing to do with their investments, because their land assets are readily marketable. Rural 
landholders do not, and the unfairness is palpable. Carter and Yao (2005, 166) comment “This inequality 
cannot be justified on any grounds and potentially constitutes an explosive factor to China’s social 
stability.” The fundamental problem, as the Development Research Center and the World Bank conclude 
  
                                                       
31 For a good examination of the impact of farmland loss in coastal Jiangsu Province, see Brown 1995. 
32 These concerns are highlighted in Development Research Center and World Bank (2005), reporting on a research program 
conducted by the Development Research Center, a research center of the State Council, with support of a team from the World 
Bank, in which the first author participated.   
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in their joint 2005 and 2007 reports, is the asymmetry in the development of property rights in land in 
rural and urban areas. They recommend that “Changes to land policy and practice should be guided by the 
overall goal of integrating the treatment of urban and rural land. Steps should be taken progressively to 
integrate urban and rural land markets, rights, planning and administration, including reducing the 
government’s monopoly over the primary market for urban land” (2007, 31). Their 2007 report is a 
forthright and careful review of options for moving forward in this area. The final step in the process, 
which began with the HRS experiments in Anhui, will be empowering farmers and other rural people to 
reap the benefits of the actual value of their land, freed from legal disabilities, to the same extent as urban 
landholders.   
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5. KEY FEATURES OF THE CHINESE REFORM EXPERIENCE 
We have seen that China is moving by many small steps but with some consistency toward what is 
effectively a system of private property in long-term and marketable land use rights, while at the same 
time conserving the principle of state and collective ownership of land. The rights enhancement process 
has moved more slowly for rural land and moved at different rates for different categories of rural land: 
residential, construction, and farm land. It is not yet complete. By way of preparation, the country is 
beginning to build the land administration institutions required for a large impersonal market in land 
rights, including a national land registration system. Such registration systems are the public 
infrastructure for the private land market. A key pending objective of reformers is fuller marketability and 
mortgageability of use rights in collectively owned residential, construction, and farm land.  
The small reform steps were not set out in a long-term plan but decided upon in long-running 
negotiations within the party, more or less intense as performance stimulated concern about rural issues. 
The land reform was dealt with in the same institutions as other key policy reforms, such as market 
liberalization, easing of residence controls, the move away from state industrial production, and 
increasing urbanization. The dialogue on these issues is increasingly public, with participants speaking 
out in public fora and the discussions being affected by popular demands for strengthened property rights. 
Reforms to date have raised popular expectations of further reform, and there is genuine excitement 
among the new middle class about enhanced property rights and the possibility that they will be 
effectively protected under a rule of law.  
At key transition points, China has provided opportunities for and encouraged community-based 
pilots to test reform ideas, often waiving or simply ignoring current law to do so. It has been well served 
by these experiments. Experiments at country and township levels with different models for post-
collective agriculture continued through the 1980s (Bruce and Harrell 1989) and even into the 1990s 
(Prosterman and Bledsoe 2000). Visiting China for the first time in 1988, Prosterman was stunned by the 
ability of a highly planned economy to allow and even promote radical local experiments that were 
clearly ideologically awkward. These experiments, it should be emphasized, were not risk-free and the 
local officials who pressed for them and national officials who promoted them showed commendable 
political courage. The fact remains, they were allowed, and studied, and policymakers did learn from 
them.  
The study and learning from such experiments owes a good deal to the role performed by another 
institutional player. Research institutions focused on rural issues, although attached to the highest level of 
government, were nonetheless allowed a fair degree of autonomy in pursing their studies and drawing 
their conclusions. Notable in years of HRS implementation and the decade following was the Research 
Center for Rural Development, led by the renowned economist Du Runsheng, cited earlier in this paper. 
The RCRD was broken up in 1989, after the Tian’anmen Square events, making clear that the license 
given to such institutes does not extend to active political involvement by their staff, but the role has been 
taken up by other similar institutions, such as the Development Research Center, and increasingly by 
researchers in China’s universities. The existence of these research institutions and the degree of 
autonomy given them to reach their conclusions independently is vital to understanding the lessons from 
local experiments and their transmission into national policymaking.  
A profile of a distinctive reform process emerges: (1) a permissive attitude by the central 
government toward local experimentation, even experiments that violated existing law and policy and 
were seriously heterodox in terms of ideology; (2) analysis and transmittal of lessons from those 
experiments into party and government by state-sponsored research institutions with a degree of 
autonomy; (3) extended dialogue on reform issues within the party and government; (4) reforms initially 
promulgated through party policy declarations, often with frequent follow-up instructions adjusting 
reform direction and urging implementation; and (5) enactment of a law or laws consolidating the 
changes once they were considered to have proved themselves. From a “rule-of-law” standpoint, this is 
problematic, and some legal commentators have struggled with China’s development successes with so  
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little law. Dam (2006), looking at these issues some years down the line, concludes that there may be 
more law in China than some commentators imagine, but this was certainly not the case in the years 
immediately after the Cultural Revolution, when the HRS was implemented. The problem is resolved if it 
is realized that party declarations did in fact have the force of law in China and in this period may have 
had more force than law.  
Finally, it is worth noting that reform has to a significant degree been driven by the central 
government, overcoming resistance on ideological grounds at the center and meeting with resistance from 
provincial and local officials and party cadres. The latter groups have had strong vested interests in the 
rent-seeking opportunities under relatively weak systems of property rights in a system of public land 
ownership. Implementation of the reforms has not been easy. Land governance in China is both de jure 
and de facto decentralized, with most important decisionmaking taking place at local levels. Often, 
reforms were announced first in terms of allowing local communities to behave in certain ways, for 
instance, to extend the terms of land use contracts. Later, in light of a tepid response reflecting resistance 
by local officials, these reforms were made mandatory.  
Perhaps the most serious blind spot of reform planners was their early neglect of the potential of 
courts in enforcing reforms. Development of the legal profession and the rule of law have lagged behind 
other developments in China, and even today, few rural residents can go to court with any confidence that 
they will be able to enforce the rights given to them by the land reforms. Reform and capacity-building in 
the courts are key tasks for ensuring security of tenure: property rights mean little if they cannot be 
enforced, and rural people need to be empowered to take the initiative to enforce their rights themselves 
in the courts, rather than relying on local officials to do so.  
A key characteristic of the Chinese reforms then was their incremental nature. In a comparative 
discussion of the reform of socialist policies and economies, the Chinese case is contrasted with the “big 
bang” reforms in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. The HRS reform was 
incremental in that it was implemented by community decision, although it actually spread quite rapidly. 
The property rights reform with regard to rural land has, however, moved quite gradually, and remains 
incomplete.  
Sequencing of land reforms in relation to other market reforms has been critical. Gulati et al. 
(2005: 47) sketch briefly the progression:
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China’s experience indicates that at the outset policymakers withdrew central 
planning and reduced the scope of procurement while expanding the role of private trade 
and markets in the allocation of resources. Thus they first created the incentives and 
institutions required by the market economy and in a subsequent stage, in the mid-1980s, 
they began to open up markets… It is not so much that the Chinese policymakers had 
planned this sequence in detail; rather, it came together from a trial-and-error approach in 
the implementation of reforms. The adoption of new measures through experimentation 
rather than following a predetermined blueprint increased the likelihood of the success of 
reforms, since it implied a “learning by doing” approach, or, in the words of Deng 
Xiaoping, “crossing the river while feeling the rocks” (Chow 2002).  
  
Chinese researchers argue strongly the benefits of this gradual process. Lin (2003, 321–325) 
notes that for ideological reasons, the reform had to be nonradical, but he argues that gradual reform had 
many advantages. He observes that most of China’s economic reforms have not been implemented at the 
                                                       
33 von Braun, Gulati, and Fan (n.d., 8-9) provide a similar analysis, emphasizing the “virtuous cycle” initiated by China’s 
market-oriented rural reforms. China “by launching market-oriented reforms in agriculture with its relatively broad distribution of 
productive assets, was able to ensure that economic gains were widespread and thus build consensus for the continuation of 
reforms. It made possible the rural industrialization, which was a major factor behind China’s rapid poverty reduction after 1985. 
When rural nonfarm enterprises became more competitive than the state-owned enterprises, the government expanded the scope 
of policy changes and put pressure on the urban economy to reform. Reforms of the state-owned enterprises in turn triggered 
macroeconomic reforms, opening up the economy further.” See also De Brauw, Huang, and Rozelle 2004.   
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same time across the country. Reform has been local in nature, both in the case of spontaneous reforms, 
such as the HRS, and of reform measures imposed by government. He notes that this minimizes risks and 
that the combination of experimental spontaneous reform and incremental reform can provide timely 
signals about how and when further reform can maximize gains. It allows the market to be established and 
fostered gradually. At the same time, incremental reform can make full use of existing organization 
resources, maintain relative stability, and ensure a smooth transition in institutions. It can also avoid 
social turbulence and avoid a waste of resources. Finally, because it was not full privatization, he argues, 
the reform did not allow the development of economic inequalities and conflict. Chen, Jefferson, and 
Singh (1992) provide a similar analysis, emphasizing the benefit of the opportunities for course 
corrections provided by incremental reform.  
This gradualist approach may also help answer why the Chinese land reform produced such 
satisfactory results, in spite of its apparently not conforming in two important respects to the conventional 
wisdom on land reform: the difficulty of scale transitions and the need for security of tenure.  
First, the issue of scale transitions. This is as much about a shift in form of production 
organization as it is about scale of operations, but the two tend to go together. The relative success of the 
East Asian land reforms of the 1950s (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) have been attributed to the fact that they 
were land-to-the-tiller programs, in the sense that most of the holdings received by reform beneficiaries 
were the same holdings they had farmed as tenants. There was no major shift in the scale of production, 
and the form of production organization (the family) remained the same (Dorner and Thiesenhusen 1990). 
This is contrasted in the literature with the Latin American reforms that involved the breakup of 
latifundia, the large privately owned estates farmed as large units with wage labor during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Those reforms seem to have suffered from the transition to a smaller scale of production, 
which theoretically might have been more efficient but did not achieve their potential because they failed 
to establish input and output linkages for the new small farmers (Thiesenhusen 1989).  
The Chinese case involved a breakup of large operating units, the communes, but the gradual 
nature of the transition allowed for input and output linkages to be maintained through state programs and 
only gradually shifted to markets. In addition, the Latin American reforms appear to have suffered from 
the lack of consistency in policy direction and weakness of political will that are characteristic of 
democracies, while the Chinese reform in this respect was closer to the successful East Asian reforms, 
which were all carried out by military-dominated governments, or in the case of Japan, by the United 
States as an occupying power. Both strong political will and the gradual nature of the reform may account 
for its success.  
The second issue has to do with security of tenure, the confident expectation by a farmer that he 
will be able to keep his land long enough to realize the benefits of his investment, without which he or she 
may not invest. Clarke (2003) raises the issue. If secure property rights are so important to investment and 
production increases, how did farmers do so well under the HRS, which over the years of its most 
impressive returns subjected farmers to both short-term land use contracts and risk of periodic 
redistribution of land among families? Conventional measures of security of tenure, considered essential 
for farmer investments in agriculture, include a combination of objective elements such as long terms and 
inheritable rights, as well as attitudinal elements such as confident expectations. By any of these 
indicators, the HRS in its early years fell well short of the ideal of tenure security. Why did it not seem to 
matter? 
The answer may lie partly in a failure to consider that whereas security of tenure in a particular 
parcel may be important for some kinds of investment, secure access to any farmland—not necessarily the 
same farmland—may be quite adequate to encourage other kinds of investment. This seems to have been 
the case in China. Most farmers did not invest in land, an investment that would take many years to 
recoup. Nor did they invest in irrigation, because that was still managed by the state, local governments, 
and the collective. For the most part, what farmers invested was their labor, and as has been seen, more 
efficient use of labor accounted for much of the production increase. In the early days of the HRS, labor 
was constrained by controls on migration, and jobs in rural industries were still quite limited: labor had 
nowhere else to go but the farm. Rural households did invest in some long-term land building, in  
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particular, mineral fertilizers. But when reforms were initiated, investment in more secure tenure niches 
was notably higher than it had been on “responsibility” land. Rural households invested heavily in 
housing on the more secure residential plots, and they showed a continued preference for investing both 
labor and other farm inputs on the more secure household food plots. The conventional understanding of 
the relationship between security of tenure and investment seems to hold, so far as it is relevant.  
Learning from China: Lessons for Developing Countries 
Today China is exporting a remarkable variety of consumer goods and ideas to the developing world, and 
leaders of developing countries are asking what they might learn from the Chinese experience in areas 
such as land and rural reform.
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At the outset, it should be noted that there are some areas in which the Chinese model does not 
deserve replication. It has been slow to recognize and even slower to find realistic solutions to problems 
faced by women in the land reform, a failure it has in common with most post-socialist states. In addition, 
although Chinese reformers have made a solid case for the advantages of incremental reform, China’s 
extension of more adequate property rights to rural people has been, not simply gradual, but painfully 
slow. It has left the rural population deeply disadvantaged in the process of asset creation in the new 
market economy by comparison with their urban cousins.  
 To what extent are successful Chinese reform models relevant to other 
developing countries? Care is needed in deciding this, because the social and economic context of the 
importing countries and their human and natural resource endowments will usually be quite different. 
When it undertook the reforms, China was a country with serious land scarcity coming out of a collective 
agriculture context, with a political system that could exert relatively tight control over population 
movements and growth and provide the political stability to allow a persistent pursuit of reform. These 
are not the characteristics of many developing countries. But are there some factors in the Chinese reform 
experience to which developing country policymakers should pay close attention in thinking through their 
own reform programs?  
But there are also many positive lessons to be drawn:  
1.  At an economic system reform level, the key lesson appears to be the proper sequencing of 
reforms. Policymakers in centrally planned economies embarking on the reform path should 
first increase incentives for production and build the institutions needed to operate efficiently 
in a market economy before rushing to open up markets (Gulati, Fan, and Dafali 2005, 46; 
von Braun, Gulati, and Fan n.d., 8–9).  
2.  Where labor costs are low and alternative employment limited, small household farms can be 
remarkably productive if they are provided with ready access to inputs, market prices, and 
good markets. The Chinese experience is a major validation of the economic understanding 
that family labor is relatively efficient because labor supervision in large production units is 
both more expensive and less effective than that in the household. This is a lesson that will be 
most relevant to countries with low rural labor costs and scarcity of accessible, arable land—a 
common situation in the developing world.  
3.  Giving priority to rural reforms, including improving the access of the rural population to 
productive assets, is highly strategic in terms of poverty reduction. Fan and Rao (2008, 60, 
65) conclude that the Chinese experience shows that whenever rural growth is strong, there is 
rapid poverty reduction. Land is quite equally distributed in China, so even the very poor 
have access to land, while in India, many of the rural poor are landless tenants and the 
poverty impacts of rural growth are less dramatic. “This strongly suggests that more equal 
distribution of production assets will lead to more poverty reduction given the same rate of 
                                                       
34 Earlier this year, at a conference in Addis Ababa sponsored by InterAfrica/Ethiopia, the authors had a chance to consider 
the relevance of the Chinese land reform pattern to another national context. Ethiopia is a country whose leadership closely 
follows the Chinese experience and whose land policies exhibit some similarity to those of China (Bruce 2009; Li 2009). That 
experience contributed substantially to the thinking about lessons learned as presented in this paper.   
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growth” (Fan and Rao 2008). This, they conclude, tells us that improvement of the asset base 
of the poor is one of the best ways to lift them out of poverty. In a poor agrarian economy, 
this means improving their access to land. 
4.  During land reform, it is important to maintain existing structures for input supply and output 
marketing during the breakup of large production units, and the provision of reliable markets 
for land reform beneficiaries in the early reform years. China provided virtually guaranteed 
markets for key economic crops in the critical reform years, and reform beneficiaries did not 
face the problems in this area that have confronted beneficiaries of many other land 
reforms.
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5.  Impressive economic growth can take place under public ownership of land if solid use rights 
are in place and farmers are operating within a larger economic framework that rewards effort 
and investment. This does not mean that private property may not be the best solution in 
many cases, but it does indicate that it is not the only adequate solution.  
  
6.   If farmers are confident that their land access is protected by a strong social commitment to 
land for all families, enhancing household or individual property rights may not be as urgent 
as is often imagined. It may be feasible to phase in stronger property rights (including 
marketability) gradually while building new mechanisms to provide the social security 
provided by universal land access. Tenure analysts studying China continue to struggle with 
this issue, seeking to find the right balance between the social security function of land and its 
growth function. If marketability reforms for rural land lag too far behind those in the urban 
areas, however, rural people cannot participate in the appreciation of land assets, as do urban 
people, and they are profoundly disadvantaged by policies that are ostensibly meant to protect 
them.  
7.  Policies that emphasize a complementary development of agriculture and industry in rural 
areas can pay off handsomely if labor is plentiful and cheap and funds are available for 
substantial public investment in rural infrastructure and facilities to support industry. China’s 
model will be applicable only if a country has substantial labor underemployed in their 
agricultural sector, but this is not an unusual situation. During the commune period, China 
laid a base for rural industrialization through massive state investment in rural infrastructure 
and the creation of collective industries. If the dual-sector rural development model is to be 
adopted, it will require heavy initial investment in rural infrastructure and facilities.  
8.  An eighth lesson, or rather a set of lessons, concerns reform processes, which are important. 
These lessons may be the most broadly relevant because they are less tied to China’s 
particular circumstances. Reforms will be beneficial if government creates the political and 
legal space for local experimentation, with a pragmatism that tolerates experiments with 
models radically different from the country’s land tenure orthodoxy. Major benefits also flow 
from giving relatively autonomous research institutes exceptional entrée to circles of power, 
so that learning from the field is conveyed to those circles.  
9.  Finally, incremental reform can have important benefits, allowing learning by doing and 
course corrections during implementation, the use of existing organizational resources, 
avoidance of social turbulence and waste of resources, and a smoother transition to new 
institutions in the longer term. Such reform, however, requires strong political will and a 
steady purpose, and these may not be present in many country contexts.  
                                                       
35 This was made possible, it should be noted, by China’s large unmet urban demand for agricultural production, which 
provided ready markets for increased production. Export markets might be able to play this role in developing countries with 
smaller urban populations.   
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Conclusion 
The reform of the HRS and the other reforms it sparked have had a profound positive influence on 
China’s growth and the welfare of its people. It is an incomplete reform, however, in that rural property 
rights remain limited and weak. This has created a dualism in land tenure, which works to the serious 
disadvantage of rural people. But unfinished land reform business is not unusual. As economies develop, 
tenure institutions must be adjusted as well to meet new needs and challenges. To paraphrase Mao, there 
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